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ABSTRACT
Scaling causality analysis for production systems
by
Michael C. Chow
Chair: Jason Flinn
Causality analysis reveals how program values influence each other. It is important
for debugging, optimizing, and understanding the execution of programs. This thesis
scales causality analysis to production systems consisting of desktop and server ap-
plications as well as large-scale Internet services. This enables developers to employ
causality analysis to debug and optimize complex, modern software systems. This
thesis shows that it is possible to scale causality analysis to both fine-grained instruc-
tion level analysis and analysis of Internet scale distributed systems with thousands
of discrete software components by developing and employing automated methods to
observe and reason about causality.
First, we observe causality at a fine-grained instruction level by developing the
first taint tracking framework to support tracking millions of input sources. We also
introduce flexible taint tracking to allow for scoping different queries and dynamic
filtering of inputs, outputs, and relationships.
Next, we introduce the Mystery Machine, which uses a “big data” approach to
discover causal relationships between software components in a large-scale Internet
service. We leverage the fact that large-scale Internet services receive a large number
x
of requests in order to observe counterexamples to hypothesized causal relationships.
Using discovered casual relationships, we identify the critical path for request execu-
tion and use the critical path analysis to explore potential scheduling optimizations.
Finally, we explore using causality to make data-quality tradeoffs in Internet ser-
vices. A data-quality tradeoff is an explicit decision by a software component to return
lower-fidelity data in order to improve response time or minimize resource usage. We
perform a study of data-quality tradeoffs in a large-scale Internet service to show the
pervasiveness of these tradeoffs. We develop DQBarge, a system that enables bet-
ter data-quality tradeoffs by propagating critical information along the causal path
of request processing. Our evaluation shows that DQBarge helps Internet services
mitigate load spikes, improve utilization of spare resources, and implement dynamic
capacity planning.
xi
CHAPTER I
Introduction
Software systems have become increasingly complex to reason about. This is
exhibited by the number of outages and bugs introduced by either errors from oper-
ators or the developers of these systems. For example, Jim Gray’s classic study [38]
attributes 42% of outages to system administration and 25% to software faults. Op-
penheimer et al. [67] found that large-scale Internet services, which handle millions
of requests a day with hundreds of software components, still suffer from these same
trends. They also found that the increased complexity of these systems caused out-
ages due to operator errors to take longer to repair. Li et. al [53] found that over
29,000 reported bugs in open source software systems were due to semantic bugs, or
bugs that arose from a programmer’s lack of understanding of the program design
requirements. Over 80% of their reported bugs were of this nature and the reported
time to diagnose and troubleshoot them was almost twice as long as other bugs. Li
et. al also found that many of these bugs can lead to security and privacy vulnerabil-
ities causing unintended consequences. Additionally, Enck et al. [34] found that in 30
Android applications, two-thirds of the applications used sensitive data suspiciously,
such as sending a user’s location to advertising servers without the user’s knowledge.
These bugs and outages arise because complexity makes it difficult for developers,
operators, and users to understand software systems, debug errors like misconfigu-
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rations, and determine how a program uses the data it reads. The complexity of
software systems makes fundamentally understanding and observing the causality of
program values difficult. Causality describes how a program value influences another
according to the data flow or control flow of the program.
Observing and understanding causality is fundamental for developers and users
to properly debug and optimize their programs. For example, developers have
used causality for debugging programs by tracing execution through causally related
events [59]. Fine-grained causality analysis at the byte-level has been used to detect
privacy leaks [34, 69, 55]. It has also been applied to debugging failures and perfor-
mance issues stemming from misconfigurations [8, 7]. Additionally, there are a large
number of systems that rely on tracking or inferring causality in order to understand
and troubleshoot large-scale distributed systems [3, 13, 23, 36, 58, 76, 99, 57]. In per-
formance debugging, understanding causality is fundamental to deriving the critical
path of execution. It has been applied in a wide variety of areas such as processor
design [82], distributed systems [12], and Internet and mobile applications [76, 95].
Causality is used in performing what-if analysis and predicting the impact of software
changes and optimizations [88, 25, 11].
However, due to the complexity of software systems, observing causality at a gran-
ularity that is useful for debugging and troubleshooting is challenging. At one end
of the spectrum, causality can be tracked at a very fine granularity at the byte level.
Fine-grained analysis, however, requires analyzing the execution at the machine in-
struction level. At this granularity, it requires analyzing the billions of instructions
that make up complex programs, which can lead to prohibitively high runtime over-
heads. The high performance overhead for fine-grained analysis is unacceptable for
online use in production systems. Therefore, offline analysis is needed. Tracking
causality at byte-level granularity requires tracking every single byte of interest that
a program reads or writes. Observing the causality between inputs and outputs at
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byte granularity requires new techniques that scale to tracking the millions of causal
relationships between bytes as the program executes.
At the other end of the spectrum, tracing causality in large-scale systems is diffi-
cult due to the sheer size of the system and the large number of components that make
up the system. Observing causality in large-scale distributed systems can be accom-
plished by comprehensively instrumenting all middleware for communication, schedul-
ing, and/or synchronization to record component interactions [3, 7, 36, 58, 76, 78, 87].
This assumes that all components within the system are homogeneous; Dapper [87],
for instance, instruments a small set of middleware components that are widely used
within Google. However, many systems grow organically over time. This can result in
a broad diversity in programming languages, communication middleware, execution
environments, and scheduling mechanisms. Adding instrumentation retroactively to
such an infrastructure is a Herculean task. Further, the end-to-end pipeline may in-
clude client software such as Web browsers, and adding detailed instrumentation to
all such software is not feasible. Thus, scalable methods for observing causality that
include automated instrumentation and inference are needed for these systems.
Modern Internet services often involve hundreds of distinct software components
cooperating to handle a single user request. Each component must balance the com-
peting goals of minimizing service response time and maximizing the quality of the
service provided. This leads to low-level components making data-quality tradeoffs,
which we define to be explicit decisions to return lower-fidelity data in order to im-
prove response time or minimize resource usage. The complexity of these large-scale
systems makes it difficult for low-level components to make decisions without ad-
ditional information. We hypothesize that propagating data along the causal path
of request processing can help these systems can make better decisions that lead to
improved data-quality tradeoffs.
The goal of this research is to provide methods for observing causality at use-
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ful granularities for debugging, understanding program execution, and optimizing
production systems. We consider two different granularities at which causality is ob-
served. The first is at the instruction level. Fine-grained causality analysis at the
instruction level allows us to observe causality between the input bytes and output
bytes of machine-level instructions. This allows us to examine byte-level relationships
between program values with applications such as understanding the provenance of
program data. The second is at the level of individual software components in a
large-scale Internet service. This allows us to reason about large-scale Internet ser-
vices from end-to-end and perform analyses such as critical path analysis. This thesis
focuses on solving some of the challenges associated with scaling causality analysis to
production systems with the goal of using causality to automate the burden of de-
bugging and optimization in modern, complex software systems. Thus, the following
statement summarizes this thesis:
Causality analysis requires observing how a large number of program
values influence each other. It is possible to scale causality analysis to
both fine-grained instruction level analysis and Internet scale distributed
systems by developing automated methods to observe and reason about
causality.
The first part of this thesis shows how to scale taint tracking to millions of program
inputs. Taint tracking, or dynamic information flow tracking, is a fine-grained causal-
ity analysis with many practical applications, such as detecting privacy leaks [62],
misconfigurations [8, 7], and understanding provenance [32]. We have designed and
implemented a taint tracking framework that is able to track millions of inputs. The
challenge of tracking large numbers of inputs in a taint tracking framework is keep-
ing track of all intermediate causal dependencies; we use a data structure called the
merge log for this purpose. We also introduce the concept of a flexible taint track-
ing framework with multiple linkage functions. Linkage functions describe different
4
causal relationships between inputs and outputs.
In the second part of the thesis, we introduce a “big data” approach that discov-
ers causal relationships between software components in a large-scale Internet service.
Our approach, called the Mystery Machine, hypothesizes all possible casual relation-
ships between each pair-wise software component. We leverage the fact that large-
scale Internet services receive a large number of requests in order to observe coun-
terexamples to the hypothesized causal relationships. The remaining relationships
are the true casual relationships. We use this approach to discover happens-before,
mutual exclusion, and pipeline relationships among the components and to construct
a dependency graph among the components. Using discovered casual relationships,
we identify the critical path for request execution. The critical path describes the
list of components where increasing the latency of that component also increase the
end-to-end latency. We perform a brief survey of how requests are broken down by
critical path for Facebook request traffic. Then, we use the critical path and resulting
slack analysis to explore a potential scheduling optimization.
In the last part of the thesis, we explore using causality in order to make bet-
ter data-quality tradeoffs in Internet services. A data-quality tradeoff is an explicit
decision by a software component to return lower-fidelity data in order to improve re-
sponse time or minimize resource usage. First, we performed a study of data-quality
tradeoffs at Facebook in order to show the pervasiveness of these decisions. The re-
sults of our study show that most data-quality tradeoffs are suboptimal in two ways.
First, most data-quality tradeoffs are reactive, instead of proactive, and rely on time-
outs to make tradeoffs. Reactive tradeoffs waste resources and exacerbate system
overload. Second, software components make these tradeoffs with only local informa-
tion because they lack higher-level knowledge such as the provenance of data, system
load, and whether they are on the critical request path. Using these results from
the study, we introduce a system, DQBarge, which propagates information along the
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causal path of processing in order to make better tradeoffs. We show how DQBarge
can be used to handle load spikes, utilize spare resources, and dynamic capacity plan-
ning. By leveraging the propagation of causal information, DQBarge can make better
data quality tradeoffs.
1.1 Roadmap
The remainder of the thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter II discusses how we scale
the intraprocess taint tracking to millions of input bytes. Chapter III describes how
we scale causality analysis in order to discover causal relationships in a large-scale
Internet service. Chapter IV describes how causality can be used in order to make
better data-quality tradeoffs in these Internet services. Chapter V discusses related
work. Chapter VI concludes with directions for future work and summarizes the
contributions of this thesis.
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CHAPTER II
Scaling intraprocess taint analysis
2.1 Introduction
Dynamic information flow tracking (DIFT), sometimes called taint tracking, is a
means of tracking the causality of data as a program executes. It is a technique widely
used in computer security [62], privacy [34], information provenance [32], application
debugging [80], and troubleshooting misconfigurations [8, 7]. DIFT instruments the
program as it executes; it has been implemented in many different runtimes, such
as dynamic language interpreters [72], virtual machines [34], binary instruction in-
strumentation [62], and hardware [29]. However, current taint tracking systems have
limitations running in a production environment. First, prior systems have been lim-
ited in the number of taint labels or inputs that can be simultaneously tracked. Prior
implementations have supported only up to 8 taint labels [48]. In order to perform
detailed taint analysis, we would ideally support many orders of magnitude more
taint labels than supported by current systems. This would allows us to track taint
from millions of input bytes to millions of output bytes. Second, as the number of
taint labels increase, taint tracking systems impose a large runtime overhead, making
them infeasible to run in a production environment.
Our goal is to provide a scalable taint tracking framework that scales to millions
of input sources. This will enable fine-grain provenance queries that allow users to
7
derive the sources at byte granularity.
Traditionally, taint tracking has been used for online security checks in order to
detect the leaking of sensitive data. Sources of sensitive data, such as password files,
are tainted as they are read into the program. If a sink, such as an output to a network
socket, contains tainted data, then the program may be sending out sensitive data.
At runtime, this behavior can be detected and stopped. We refer to these queries, as
forward queries. In forward queries, the sensitive sources are known ahead of time
and the user wishes to know which sinks are causally affected. In other words, forward
queries answer the question of what data is affected by a source.
In this thesis we focus on enabling backward queries. In these queries, the user
is interested in what sources affected a sink. These queries are not run for online
security checking, but rather, they are run for offline forensic analysis. Backward
queries answer the question of what sources influenced a given output or program
value.
Creating a taint tracking system to support backward queries poses several chal-
lenges that do not exist in answering forward queries. In order to answer a forward
query, only the sources of interest need to be tracked. Therefore only a single bit or
a predefined small set of bits are required to answer the query: was the data derived
from a tainted data source or not? However, in order to answer a backward query,
all unique sources of input need to be tracked as the program executes so that the
specific sources can be determined at each sink. This is challenging because taint
tracking now requires keeping a taint set for each memory location, and because taint
sets grow to be larger as the number of unique sources increases. Resolving taint sets
at runtime leads to a large amount of overhead.
This work makes the following contributions. Our taint tracking framework is the
first taint tracking framework that supports tracking millions of input sources, and
the merge log is the key to this scaling. The merge log is a data structure that enables
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efficient operations on taint sets with a large number of distinct sources. Second, we
use deterministic replay in order to provide low runtime overhead while providing
the ability to perform offline forensic taint tracking queries. Finally, we provide a
flexible taint tracking framework that supports different propagation functions, called
linkage functions, that describe different lineages of data. Our flexible taint tracking
framework allows for scoping different queries by using various input and output
filters. Our evaluation shows how our framework can support tracking up to tens of
millions of unique sources in several desktop and server applications while providing
low online overhead.
2.2 Dynamic information flow tracking background
Dynamic information flow tracking (DIFT) traces how data flows through a pro-
gram by instrumenting an executing program. Taint tracking reveals which sources
(inputs) causally affect which sinks (outputs) according to a propagation function.
Sources of input are typically external program inputs such as bytes read from a file
or network socket. Sinks are typically external outputs such as data written to a file
or network socket. Taint tracking works by assigning a taint identifier to each unique
source. As the program executes, the analysis code maintains a taint set for each
location of memory. The taint set represents the sources that have affected that par-
ticular byte of memory at the point of the execution. At an output sink, taint tracking
identifies the set of taint identifiers that have affected each byte that is output. Taint
sets are updated for every instruction executed for the locations that the instruction
affects. The propagation function determines how these taint sets are updated for
each instruction. For example, using the basic data flow propagation function for an
instruction that does an add, x = y + z, the updated taint set for x would be the
union of the taint sets of y and z. Propagation functions can express a variety of
causal relationships between the source and destination operands of instructions. In
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section 2.3, we discuss how we leverage different propagation functions in order to
track various definitions of data provenance.
2.3 Flexible taint tracking
The goal of our work is to provide a taint tracking framework that allows expres-
sive, detailed queries on the provenance of data in programs.
First, the user may only be concerned with certain outputs of a program; e.g.
only program output sent to unknown destinations. Second, the user may only be
concerned about data from certain inputs of a program; e.g. data from files that
match a certain regex or only the data received from a network socket. Our taint
tracking framework is flexible in the ability to allow users to scope the inputs and
outputs of queries.
The user may wish to know not only what sources of data affected an output but
also how the sources influenced the output. For example, the user may query what
bytes of the output were directly copied from an input source. In another query, the
user may ask what bytes of the output were computed from an input source. In order
to accomplish this, our taint tracking framework is flexible in its propagation func-
tions. It supports queries that track different types of causal relationships between
data. We define several linkage functions that specify how outputs are influenced by
inputs. We provide several common linkage functions described below. Additional
linkage functions can be defined according to how an input influences its output. Our
predefined linkage functions are:
• Copy. An input influences an output only if the output copies the value of the
input (e.g., via a move instruction).
• Data flow. An input influences an output if the input is used to calculate the
value of the output (e.g., via an add instruction).
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• Index. An input influences an output if the input is used to calculate the
output or if the input is used as an index to load a value used to calculate the
output (e.g., via an array or lookup table index).
Our taint tracking framework tracks causality at a byte-level granularity. This
allows the user to understand the inputs that have influenced any byte that a program
outputs. Our taint tracking tool works at the machine instruction level using dynamic
binary instrumentation to instrument every instruction and propagate taint according
to the specified linkage function. Taint is propagated using a set of simple taint
operations:
• Set. The set operation sets the taint label for a specified location.
• Clear. The clear operation clears the taint label at a given location, setting
the taint label for that location to be the null taint.
• Copy. The copy operation sets the taint label at the destination location to be
the same as the source’s taint label.
• Merge. The merge operation takes two sets of taint labels and returns the
union of the taint sets. It is used to merge dependencies.
Linkage functions describe, for a particular instruction, the set of taint operations
that relate the instruction’s inputs and outputs. Table 2.1 shows an example program
and the subsequent taint operations for each of the supported linkage functions.
The copy linkage only tracks data copies. Therefore, for memory copy instructions,
such as mov, we execute a corresponding copy taint operation for each byte in order
to propagate the taint label for that byte. In the copy relationship, data operations
such as add result in clear taint operations. In Table 2.1, instructions 4 and 5 show
that the copy linkage clears taints, but the copy linkage maintains move and copy
relationships in instruction 6. The data flow relationship propagates taint if the input
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Instructions Copy Data Index
1. A = read() A: IN0 A: IN0 A: IN0
2. B = read() B: IN1 B: IN1 B: IN1
3. C = read() C: IN2 C: IN2 C: IN2
4. D = A + B D: {} D: {IN0, IN1} D: {IN0, IN1}
5. E = C + D E: {} E: {IN0, IN1, IN2} E: {IN0, IN1, IN2}
6. F = C F: {IN2} F: {IN2} F: {IN2}
7. Y = [1, 2, 3] Y: {} Y: {} Y: {}
8. Z = Y[D] Z: {} Z: {} Z: {IN0, IN1}
9. write(Z) OUT0: {} OUT0: {} OUT0: {IN0, IN1}
Table 2.1: Linkage function examples Taint tracking analysis of an example pro-
gram with the different linkage functions.
of an instruction is used to calculate the value of the output. In Table 2.1, for the
data flow relationship, instructions 4 and 5 merge the taint sets of the instructions’
inputs. The data flow analysis is a superset of the copy analysis so instruction 6
still maintains the relationships propagated in the copy analysis. The index linkage
function propagates taint if the input is used to calculate an output or if the input
is used as an index to load a value to calculate the output, such as via an array or
lookup table index. Instruction 8 shows using an instruction’s input as an index, so
that relationship is propagated through to the instruction’s output.
Our taint tracking tools use Pin [56] binary instrumentation to dynamically in-
strument a program as it executes. We chose Pin because it is a flexible and well-
documented tool. We make use of Pin’s dynamic binary instrumentation facility in
order to dynamically insert taint propagation logic to track and propagate taint for
every x86 instruction executed. Each linkage function is implemented as a separate
Pin tool that inserts the proper taint operation(s) for each x86 instruction. Our taint
tracking framework provides an interface of taint operations that a linkage function
Pin tool should implement. Implementing a new linkage tool only necessitates im-
plementing the functions of the interface, i.e, providing an implementation for each
taint operation.
There are several challenges with implementing a taint tracking framework using
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dynamic binary instrumentation. In order to track causality at such a fine-granularity,
all instructions of the application need to be instrumented so that the relationships
between inputs and outputs can be tracked. Instrumenting all instructions of an
application can lead to prohibitively high online overhead. Additionally, in order to
efficiently implement these taint operations, we need to be able to compactly represent
sets of taints, lookup the taint at any program location efficiently, and merge two taint
sets efficiently. We describe how we implement these operations in an efficient manner
in the next section.
2.4 Efficient taint representation
Every source byte that is tracked is assigned an integer taint identifier when
it is read into the program. We track all sources of input to the program from
external sources through the kernel by intercepting all input system calls using Pin.
Additionally, environment variables and arguments passed into the program via the
execve system call are tracked as sources of input.
We maintain a mapping of taint labels to the bytes read via input system calls.
Taint labels are represented as integers. A taint label represents a unique source of
input. The locations of the taint creation are initially set to their corresponding taint
label. For example, the taint at the address of each byte of a read buffer is set to the
newly created taint labels.
In order to efficiently track taint as the system propagates, we require data struc-
tures that allow us to quickly look up the taint of any location in the process’s address
space or CPU registers. We maintain an array of taint labels for each CPU register
for each thread of execution. In order to efficiently map the process’s address space,
we use a two-level page table structure that shadows the process’s address space. We
choose to map the address space using a page table since the address spaces of most
processes are sparse.
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Next, we need data structures that allow for fast implementation of all of the taint
operations (clear, set, copy, and merge). It is important that these operations are
fast since the number of taint operations that are executed is on the same order of
magnitude as the number of machine instructions executed. The clear and set taint
operations are made efficient using the page table structure for memory locations.
These operations are both O(1) operations in the number of input bytes. Using an
array for CPU registers also is an O(1) operation for clears and sets on registers.
However, supporting the merge taint operation requires additional data structures in
order to be fast.
When there is a limited number of taints, a taint label can be represented as a
bit vector or array. For example, using a bit vector representation, a 32-bit integer
representation of a taint label supports 32 possible input labels, with each bit posi-
tion representing a taint label. This representation makes set and merge operations
efficient. An initial set operation can be accomplished by performing a bitwise shift to
set the appropriate bit. A merge operation is accomplished by performing a bitwise
OR operation on the taint bit vector representations. However, the drawbacks of this
approach is that only a finite number of taints are representable.
Alternatively, a set of taints could be represented as a list of taint labels. However,
during the program execution, in order to propagate taint, we need to have a mapping
of all taint locations to set of taints. This representation is not very space efficient;
each location points to a separate list. There is also high memory overhead as nodes
in each list need to be allocated and deallocated as taint is added or removed from
the taint set. Also, this representation means that merging taints requires merging
two lists, which is a slow operation.
Thus, the merge operation adds an additional complication in choosing how to
represent taints; we not only wish to efficiently represent all input taint labels but we
also need to efficiently represent all possible sets of taints while the program executes.
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Figure 2.1: Taint graph. Representation of how sets of taint labels are represented
as a directed acyclic graph. A pointer to a node in the graph only needs to be stored
in order to represent a taint set. In order to resolve what input taint labels are in the
taint set, we walk upwards from the pointer until all root nodes have been resolved.
Our insight is that taint sets only need to be resolved at certain outputs. Only at these
outputs do we have to determine the set of input taint labels that have influenced the
output. Thus, we simply need to propagate enough information so that the taint set
can be calculated when needed.
In order to efficiently support the merge operation, we use an idea proposed by
Ruwase et al. [80] in which sets of taint values are represented by a binary tree. This
data structure takes advantage of the observation that all possible taint states must
be derived from an input taint label. For example, in Table 2.2, instruction 4 requires
merging the taint sets for the inputs A and B. The taint set {IN0, IN1}, is the result
of the merge of the input taint sets. Each merge set can be represented as a pointer
to its two parent taint sets. Thus, all merge states can be encoded in a directed,
acyclic graph where root nodes are inputs. Intermediate nodes represent taint labels
resulting from merge operations. In order to resolve the inputs that a particular
output depends on, we can perform a depth-first traversal of the root node entry to
discover the entire input set. Thus, instead of storing the taint set for every memory
location, all possible taint sets are encoded in the merge log. Then, instead of storing
the entire set of taints, we store a pointer into the merge log that represents the set
of taints that have influenced that location. A logical representation of this is shown
in Figure 2.1.
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Instructions Data Merge log
1. A = read() A: IN0
2. B = read() B: IN1
3. C = read() C: IN2
4. D = A + B D: M [0] M [0] = {IN0, IN1}
5. E = C + D E: M [1] M [1] = {IN2,M [0]}
6. F = C F: IN2
7. Y = [1, 2, 3] Y: ∅
8. Z = Y[D] Z: ∅
9. write(Z) OUT0: {}
Table 2.2: Merge log example An example of how the merge log tracks and resolves
the union of taint sets in a data flow analysis.
Each entry in the merge log represents a binary tree of taint identifiers rooted at
that node. The merge log itself is an append-only log with each new entry representing
a new merge operation. The merge log leverages the property that the resulting taint
set of a merge operation is the union of two existing taint sets. Each entry in the
merge log represents the result of a merge operation. It contains two pointers to
the previous taint sets. A representation of the merge log is show in Figure 2.2.
Table 2.2 walks through an example program showing the contents of the merge log
as the program executes a data flow analysis. In order to make the merge log efficient,
merge operations are restricted to be binary operations with two inputs. For merges
that require more than two inputs, these merges are broken up into multiple pairwise
merge operations.
Our design differs from Ruwase et al.’s algorithm in that Ruwase et al. applied
the merge log to abstract taint values. They stored a symbolic representation of
where the taint for a particular location was derived from. Their design computed
the concrete taint value by resolving the symbolic representation for different tainted
inputs. The symbolic representation was applied to parallelize sequential taint track-
ing. Our enhancements to the merge log allows our taint tracking framework to scale
to millions of dependencies. Our merge log keeps track of concrete taint values and
defers resolving the union of taint sets. The merge log uses much less memory than
16
2"
1"
3"
1" 2" 3"
Figure 2.2: Merge log. The left diagram shows the merge log. Each entry contains
the two pointers to the taint sets that were merged. Each entry in the merge log refers
to either a previous entry in the merge log or an input taint label. The right diagram
shows the directed acyclic graph of merge operations that the merge log encodes.
storing a set for each location. Memory usage is proportional to the number of merge
operations rather than the total size of all taint sets for every location. The cost of
using a merge log is that a tree traversal must be performed when resolving a root
node to a set of source identifiers.
There are, however, some tradeoffs in this design. By encoding taint sets as a
graph, the same taint set can exist in the graph if the taint set were created using a
different ordering of merge operations. This can lead to duplicate nodes in the graph.
We found that, in practice, this occurs rarely due to the nature of data flow analysis.
Since every taint set is encoded in this graph, in order to resolve the input taint
labels, the graph needs to be walked upwards for every single output byte. We can
amortize the cost of walking the graph by memoizing the resolution of intermediate
merge nodes.
Several optimizations are made in the merge operation. Merges with the null taint
set return the non-null taint set and do not create an entry in the merge log. Merges
between the same taint set (i.e., represented by the same pointer) return the same
taint set without creating a new merge log entry. Since taint sets are represented by
a pointer in the merge log implementation, the two merge operands are first ordered
before merging. The two pointers are then non-associatively hashed, for performance,
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and stored in a hash table with the resulting merged taint set. Therefore, repeated
merges of the same taint sets do not create a new merge log entry.
Another added benefit of using the merge log is the deferral of resolving taints
to an offline phase. For each output of interest, only the pointer into the merge log
needs to be saved in order to resolve it. Since the merge log is append-only, at the
end of execution all of the information to resolve a taint identifier in the merge log
still exists. This allows us to reduce the amount of instrumentation that needs to be
added at runtime, improving performance.
2.5 Interplay of deterministic replay with taint tracking
Another challenge with dynamic taint tracking is the large runtime overhead asso-
ciated with tracking a large number of taint inputs. Deterministic replay is a tried and
tested technique of faithfully reproducing an execution of a program. Deterministic
replay can be implemented at several abstraction layers such as the virtual machine
monitor [33], the operating system kernel [92], or a user-level library [71]. We wish
that our deterministic replay system provide a low runtime overhead while allowing
us to dynamically analyze the running execution. For this reason, we chose to use an
operating system level deterministic replay system [92].
We needed to make modifications to the replay implementation because of our
desire to use Pin to insert binary instrumentation into replayed executions. This
implementation faces a substantial challenge: from the point of view of the replay
system, the replayed execution is not the same as the recorded execution because it
contains additional binary instrumentation not present during recording. While Pin
is transparent to the application being instrumented, it is not transparent to lower
layers such as the OS.
Our replay system is instrumentation-aware; it compensates for the divergences
in replayed execution caused by dynamic instrumentation. Pin makes many system
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calls, so our replay system allocates a memory area that allows analysis tools run by
Pin to inform the replay kernel which system calls are initiated by the application
(and should be replayed from the log) and which are initiated by Pin or the analysis
tool (and should execute normally).
It also compensates for interference between resources requested by the recorded
application and resources requested by Pin or an analysis tool. For instance, Pin
might request that the kernel mmap a free region of memory. If the kernel grants Pin
an arbitrary region, it might later be unable to reproduce the effects of a recorded
application mmap that returns the same region. Our replay system avoids this trap by
initially scanning the replay log to identify all regions that will be requested by the
recorded application and pre-allocating them so that Pin does not ask for them and
the kernel does not return them.
The replay system avoid avoids conflicts for signal handlers in a similar manner.
Since Pin allows for the ability to perform an arbitrary action on receipt of a signal,
it must intercept all signal delivered to the application process first. This is at odds
with the replay system, which deterministically replays the delivery of signals to
the process. Our replay system avoid conflicts for signal handlers by allowing Pin to
register its signal handlers and signal masks during replay. Then, all signals, including
replayed signals, are delivered to Pin.
Finally, the replay system must avoid deadlock. The replay system adds synchro-
nization to reproduce the same order of system calls, synchronization events, and
racing instructions seen during recording. Pin adds synchronization to ensure that
application operations such as memory allocation are executed atomically with the
Pin code that monitors those events. Our replay system initially deadlocked because
it was unaware of Pin locking. To compensate, it now only blocks threads when it
knows Pin is not holding a lock; e.g., rather than block threads executing a system
call, it blocks them prior to the instruction that follows the system call.
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2.6 Evaluation
In this section we evaluate how effective the linkage tools are at achieving our
goals. In particular, we will answer the questions:
• What is the runtime overhead of the linkage tools?
• How much additional work is required to go from forward dynamic taint analysis
to backward dynamic taint analysis?
We evaluated on taint tracking framework on a 3.1GHz Xeon server with 8GB
of RAM. We used a deterministic replay system based on the 32-bit Linux kernel
3.5.7.13. Since our deterministic replay system schedules threads to execute on a
single core when replaying execution, our analysis uses only a single core.
2.6.1 Runtime overhead
First, we will look at the runtime overhead of the tools. Since all of the analy-
sis is performed offline, the runtime overhead is comprised of recording a process’s
execution.
We measured online overhead by comparing the throughput and latency of
Apache, lighttpd, postfix, and Postgre when they are recorded by our deterministic
replay system to results when the applications run on default Linux without record-
ing. For Apache and lighttpd, we used ab to send 5000 requests for a 35KB static
Web page with a concurrency of 50 requests at a time over an isolated network. For
Postfix, we used smtp-source to send 1000 64KB mail messages. For PostgreSQL, we
used pgbench to measure the number of transactions completed in 60 seconds with
a concurrency of 10 transactions at a time. Each transaction has one SELECT, three
UPDATEs, and one INSERT command.
Our system adds an average of 2.3% throughput overhead: 0.1% for Apache, 4.7%
for Postfix, 3.5% for PostgreSQL, and 0.8% for lighttpd. These values include the
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cost of logging data races previously detected by our offline data race detector. This
overhead is consistent with similar deterministic replay approaches [28]. Latency
overheads for Apache, PostgreSQL, and lighttpd are equivalent to the respective
throughput overheads; Postfix has no meaningful latency measure since its processing
is asynchronous. The recording log sizes were 2.8MB for Apache, 1.6MB for lighttpd,
321MB for PostgreSQL, and 15MB for Postfix. Apache and lighttpd have smaller
logs because they use sendfile to avoid copying data.
2.6.2 Scaling the linkage tools
Next, we look at the performance of the copy, data flow, and index linkage tools
in analyzing the input and output relationships in a set of programs and how they
scale to an increasing size of inputs and number of dependencies. We evaluated our
tools on 7 commonly used desktop programs and server workloads:
• Gzip – Zip a large file
• Ghostscript – Convert a research poster .ps to .pdf
• Evince – Open and view a research paper
• Mongodb – Yahoo cloud server benchmark
• Nginx – Serve static content
• OpenOffice – Edit a conference presentation
• Firefox – A long Facebook browsing section
We show the time to replay each benchmark without instrumentation as a base-
line. Note that replay time is not equivalent to the original application execution
time; instead, replay time can be one to two orders of magnitude faster [32] because
deterministic replay omits all user think-time (for interactive applications), network
delays and idle time (for servers), and external output.
For Gzip, Evince, Mongodb, Nginx, all of the linkage queries ask for all depen-
dencies between command-line, network, and file-system inputs to all such outputs.
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Running the all-to-all query for Ghostscript, OpenOffice, and Firefox produces a
large amount of data, so the queries were refined to produce manageable results. The
Ghostscript query only considers file system data from the input file, the OpenOffice
query only considers file system data from a portion of the input file, and the Firefox
query only considers cookies data to be sources and network output to specific sites
to be outputs.
First, we implemented a forward taint tracking tool to establish a baseline for eval-
uating the performance of our tools. It uses a single bit to track tainted or untainted
data and works with our deterministic replay system. We compare the performance
of our forward taint tracking implementation with an existing taint tracking imple-
mentation, libdft [48]. We used the baseline libdft tool that uses a single bit to track
tainted or untainted data. It tracks all input from the file system, except for shared
libraries, and all incoming network data. We ran the base libdft implementation 5
times on our computational benchmarks, Gzip and Ghostscript. As noted previously,
running libdft on our interactive and server benchmarks without deterministic replay,
on live execution, does not provide a sound comparison as replay time is not equiva-
lent to application execution time. For Gzip, the libdft analysis took on average 18.71
seconds with a standard deviation of 0.15. For Ghostscript, the libdft analysis took
on average 19.90 seconds with a standard deviation of 0.30. This is 8.6 times longer
than normal execution for Gzip and 46.3 times longer for Ghostscript. In comparison,
our forward taint tracking tool took 1.9 times longer than libdft for both Gzip and
Ghostscript. Unlike libdft, our forward taint tracking analysis is done offline using
deterministic replay.
Our forward taint tracking tool is slower than libdft for two main reasons. First,
libdft has a more efficient forward taint-tracking implementation and has made op-
timizations for faster Pin instrumentation. Libdft has optimized its taint tracking
analysis code to avoid branches and keeps its analysis code short so that Pin can
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Benchmark Execution time (s) libdft (s) Replay + null Pin (s) Replay + forward (s)
gzip 2.18 +− 0.03 18.71 +− 0.15 9.23 +− 0.07 35.11 +− 0.23
ghostscript 0.43 +− 0.01 19.90 +− 0.3 19.60 +− 0.38 38.47 +− 0.98
Table 2.3: Comparison with libdft This table show the evaluation of an existing
taint tracking framework, libdft, compared with our forward taint tracking implemen-
tation. Each result in the average analysis time taken over 5 runs with the standard
deviation.
inline it. Second, as previously stated, our forward taint tracking tool has been mod-
ified to work with our deterministic replay system. The required modifications are
described in section 2.5. These modifications require that Pin insert additional instru-
mentation to support our deterministic replay system; this adds overhead compared
with running libdft on live execution. To measure this overhead, we implemented a
null Pin tool. The null Pin tool adds the minimum instrumentation to support our
deterministic replay system; it is the lower bound on any Pin tool run with our deter-
ministic replay system. Over 5 runs, the null Pin tool took on average 9.23 seconds
with a standard deviation of 0.07 for Gzip. For Ghostscript, it took an average of
19.60 seconds with a standard deviation of 0.38. Adding our forward taint tracking
instrumentation increases the analysis time by 3.80 times (to 35.11 seconds) for Gzip
and 1.96 times (to 38.47 seconds) for Ghostscript. Table 2.3 provides a summary of
the overhead of libdft on live execution compared with the replay time of Gzip and
Ghostscript with the null Pin tool and our forward taint tracking tool.
Next, we compare the additional analysis time of our linkage tools compared with
our baseline forward taint tracking tool. Table 2.4 shows the results for each workload
evaluated under each linkage tool. For each benchmark, we show the number of input
bytes considered in each query and the number of input-output dependencies each
query produces. The replay time is the time to re-execute the program without any
analysis.
Our linkage tools, on average across all 7 benchmarks, track the relationships
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between 15,330,432.3 unique inputs to 48,338,413.3 unique outputs. Our tools were
able to track over 64 million unique inputs for Gzip and all but one benchmark
had millions of unique inputs. This is many orders of magnitude greater than prior
systems. Across all benchmarks, the copy, data flow, and index linkage tools took only
37.6%, 44.1%, and 182.3% longer than the forward tool, respectively. Additionally, we
show the flexibility of our taint tracking system. Our framework allows us to track
different relationships using the copy, data, and index linkages without drastically
changing the analysis time of each tool. The data flow tool took, on average, 9.6%
longer than the copy tool and the index tool took, on average, 68.1% longer than the
data flow tool.
The index linkage produces the longest queries as the index linkage function tracks
a significantly larger number of dependencies. The longest index linkage query was on
Firefox with a query runtime of approximately 82 minutes. However, as mentioned
previously, these queries are performed offline using deterministic replay. Since more
complicated linkage functions produce a greater number of dependencies, we envision
users employing these queries on targeted inputs.
2.6.3 Scalability of the merge log and limitations
Next we discuss the scalability of the merge log. Table 2.5 shows the merge log
size for each of the previous benchmarks. The copy linkage does not produce a merge
log since it performs no taint merge operations. The largest merge logs were with the
index linkage analyzing mongo and Firefox with 1.7GB and 1.3GB merge log sizes,
respectively. In all of these queries the merge log fits in the 32-bit process address
space. The current implementation keeps the merge log in memory for the duration
of the analysis. The Ghostscript, OpenOffice, and Firefox queries only considered a
subset of inputs since running the all-to-all queries would produce a merge log that
exceeded the process address space.
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The merge log scales taint tracking to millions of inputs by enabling a merge
operation with an online cost comparable to a bitmask merge operation used by prior
systems. However, using the merge log results in an extra step of computation where
the outputs need to be resolved to inputs by traversing the graph encoded in the merge
log. Our system can become bottlenecked whenever traversing this graph becomes
prohibitively expensive since resolving every byte of output requires performing a
traversal of the graph.
One case where the traversal becomes prohibitively expensive is when the merge
log no longer fits in the process address space. Since the merge log is an append-only
data structure, segments of the merge log can be stored once the memory limit has
been reached and a new merge log segment can be allocated. However, a traversal of
the merge log can now span multiple segments that do not fit in memory. Therefore,
a traversal of the graph could require loading and unloading segments of the merge
log into memory. This would lead to a substantial slowdown.
A potential solution for solving this bottleneck would be to move the processing
of the merge log to a machine with a 64-bit address space so that the entire merge
log can fit in memory. Since the merge log is a directed acyclic graph, we can also
leverage existing graph databases that are optimized for large graphs and high query
throughput [79, 66]. Using these systems, we could potentially scale the processing
of the merge log to a large cluster. This would scale both the time to resolve a single
byte of output and allow for an increased parallelization of resolving outputs.
Another case where traversals can become expensive is if an output byte depends
on a large number of input bytes, so a traversal requires visiting many intermediate
nodes. Applications that perform operations on binary data often result in a large
number of data operations to track the propagation of taint. This results in a pattern
where a large number of input bytes have a relationship with a large number of
output bytes. For example, the encrypting of data can lead to such behavior. This
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taint explosion is common with taint tracking. Previous systems have mitigated taint
explosion by using taint abstraction [8]. Common well-defined library functions are
abstracted away using manual annotations describing how the inputs to the functions
affect the output. Therefore using taint abstraction techniques that are aware of
the binary formats can significantly reduce the analysis runtime (by eliding taint
propagation for these functions) and reduce the merge log size.
Another bottleneck of the merge log is that it is produced sequentially. Taint
tracking, by definition, is sequential since the analysis examines dependencies as a
program executes. The dependencies are recorded in the merge log as the program
executes. Because of this, the analysis is bound by the execution time of the program.
Even though we defer the analysis offline using deterministic replay, the analysis
requires the entire program to be re-executed in order to track dependencies between
inputs and outputs. For long running applications, such as a web server serving
traffic for days, this would require performing the analysis for the duration of the
program’s execution. Parallelizing the taint analysis so that it can be completed
faster is non-trivial and we leave this as future work [75].
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter of this thesis, we have proposed a set of linkage tools used for un-
derstanding the relationships between inputs and outputs of a process. These linkage
tools make use of fine-grained instruction-level taint tracking that scales to a large
set of inputs. This enables determining of fine-grained, byte-level provenance of the
output of a process. We enable the use of such analysis by modifying a deterministic
replay system to be instrumentation-aware. We show that this allows for low online
runtime overhead by performing the analysis offline. Finally, we show the effectiveness
of our tools by analyzing a set of commonly used programs.
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Benchmark Replay Input Output Linkage Runtime (s) Dependencies
Time (s) bytes bytes
gzip 2.07 64,352,941 48,791,393
Forward 35.11 +− 0.23 36,586,765
Copy 66.65 +− 0.18 36,586,765
Data 67.71 +− 0.22 36,586,765
Index 74.60 +− 0.54 36,586,765
ghostscript 0.67 2,514,067 176,009
Forward 38.47 +− 0.98 14,682,254
Copy 54.82 +− 1.05 100,363
Data 56.34 +− 1.23 14,682,254
Index 190.35 +− 0.82 685,205,917
evince 7.81 10,302,848 104,061,604
Forward 124.28 +− 1.76 895,684
Copy 143.80 +− 1.43 144,670
Data 153.28 +− 3.93 895,684
Index 395.14 +− 3.65 70,842,186
nginx 2.88 10,412,627 35,000,000
Forward 83.01 +− 2.50 5,000,000
Copy 112.61 +− 0.97 5,000,000
Data 116.71 +− 1.03 5,000,000
Index 120.44 +− 0.41 5,000,000
mongo 15.63 8,863,855 116,592,809
Forward 133.68 +− 2.93 76,042,962
Copy 190.06 +− 0.74 76,042,962
Data 201.69 +− 3.16 76,042,962
Index 266.22 +− 0.47 76,538,822
openoffice 5.17 9,946,659 32,110,959
Forward 259.61 +− 3.5 1,764,494
Copy 282.02 +− 0.57 1,764,446
Data 292.56 +− 2.07 1,764,494
Index 294.88 +− 4.85 1,764,504
firefox 45.53 920,029 1,636,119
Forward 1002.85 +− 16.7 131,476
Copy 1295.23 +− 9.34 131,476
Data 1337.74 +− 9.09 131,476
Index 4945.06 +− 24.69 7,137,269
Table 2.4: Linkage tool evaluation This tables show the evaluation of our taint
tracking framework with our predefined linkage tools on several desktop and server
applications. It shows the number of unique inputs, output, and dependencies each
linkage tool tracked as well as the duration of the analysis time for each linkage
function. Each of the analysis time shown is the average analysis time taken over 5
runs with the standard deviation.
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Benchmark Linkage tool Merge log size (bytes)
gzip
Data 1,944
Index 127,844,552
ghostscript
Data 13,978,144
Index 51,765,000
evince
Data 6,853,304
Index 18,693,064
nginx
Data 16,012,056
Index 16,012,416
mongo
Data 299,222,288
Index 1,715,635,776
openoffice
Data 5,931,368
Index 5,925,264
firefox
Data 39,469,248
Index 1,343,744,416
Table 2.5: Merge log size This table shows the size of the merge log structure at
the end of the benchmark execution.
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CHAPTER III
The Mystery Machine: End-to-end performance
analysis of Internet services
In this part of the thesis, we develop performance analysis tools for measuring
and uncovering performance insights about complex, heterogeneous distributed sys-
tems. We apply these tools to the Facebook Web pipeline. Specifically, we measure
end-to-end performance from the point when a user initiates a page load in a client
Web browser, through server-side processing, network transmission, and JavaScript
execution, to the point when the client Web browser finishes rendering the page.
We develop a technique that generates a causal model of system behavior without
the need to add substantial new instrumentation or manually generate a schema of
application behavior. Instead, we generate the model via large-scale reasoning over
individual software component logs. Our key observation is that the sheer volume
of requests handled by modern services allows us to gather observations of the order
in which messages are logged over a tremendous number of requests. We can then
hypothesize and confirm relationships among those messages. We demonstrate the
efficacy of this technique with an implementation that analyzes over 1.3 million Face-
book requests to generate a comprehensive model of end-to-end request processing.
Logging is an almost-universally deployed tool for analysis of production software.
Indeed, although there was no comprehensive tracing infrastructure at Facebook prior
29
to our work, almost all software components had some individual tracing mechanism.
By relying on only a minimum common content for component log messages (a request
identifier, a host identifier, a host-local timestamp, and a unique event label), we
unified the output from diverse component logs into a unified tracing system called
U¨berTrace.
U¨berTrace’s objective is to monitor end-to-end request latency, which we define to
be the time that elapses from the moment the user initiates a Facebook Web request
to the moment when the resulting page finishes rendering. U¨berTrace monitors a
diverse set of activities that occur on the client, in the network and proxy layers,
and on servers in Facebook data centers. These activities exhibit a high degree of
concurrency.
To understand concurrent component interactions, we construct a causality model
from a large corpus of U¨berTrace traces. We generate a cross-product of possible
hypotheses for relationships among the individual component events according to
standard patterns (currently, happens-before, mutual exclusive, and first-in-first-out
relationships). We assume that a relationship holds until we observe an explicit con-
tradiction. Our results show that this process requires traces of hundreds of thousands
of requests to converge on a model. However, for a service such as Facebook, it is triv-
ial to gather traces at this scale even at extremely low sampling frequencies. Further,
the analysis scales well and runs as a parallel Hadoop job.
Thus, our analysis framework, The Mystery Machine derives its causal model
solely from empirical observations that utilize only the existing heterogeneous com-
ponent logs. The Mystery Machine uses this model to perform standard analyses,
such as identifying critical paths, slack analysis, and outlier detection.
We also present a detailed case study of performance optimization based on results
from The Mystery Machine. First, we note that whereas the average request workload
shows a balance between client, server, and network time on the critical path, there is
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wide variance in this balance across individual requests. In particular, we demonstrate
that Facebook servers have considerable slack when processing some requests, but
they have almost no slack for other requests. This observation suggests that end-to-
end latency would be improved by having servers produce elements of the response
as they are needed, rather than trying to produce all elements as fast as possible. We
conjecture that this just-in-time approach to response generation will improve the
end-to-end latency of requests with no slack while not substantially degrading the
latency of requests that currently have considerable slack.
Implementing such an optimization is a formidable task, requiring substantial
programming effort. To help justify this cost by partially validating our conjecture,
we use The Mystery Machine to perform a “what-if” analysis. We use the inherent
variation in server processing time that arises naturally over a large number of requests
to show that increasing server latency has little effect on end-to-end latency when slack
is high. Yet, increasing server latency has an almost linear effect on end-to-end latency
when slack is low. Further, we show that slack can be predicted with reasonable
accuracy. Thus, the case study demonstrates two separate benefits of The Mystery
Machine: (1) it can identify opportunities for performance improvement, and (2) it
can provide preliminary evidence about the efficacy of hypothesized improvements
prior to costly implementation.
3.1 Background
There is a rich history of systems that understand, optimize, and troubleshoot
software performance, both in practice and in the research literature. Yet, most of
these prior systems deal poorly with the complexities that arise from modern Internet
service infrastructure. Complexity comes partially from scale; a single Web request
may trigger the execution of hundreds of executable components running in parallel
on many different computers. Complexity also arises from heterogeneity; executable
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components are often written in different languages, communicate through a wide
variety of channels, and run in execution environments that range from third-party
browsers to open-source middleware to in-house, custom platforms.
Fundamentally, analyzing the performance of concurrent systems requires a model
of application behavior that includes the causal relationships between components;
e.g., happens-before ordering and mutual exclusion. While the techniques for per-
forming such analysis (e.g., critical path analysis) are well-understood, prior systems
make assumptions about the ease of generating the causal model that simply do not
hold in many large-scale, heterogeneous distributed systems.
Many prior systems assume that one can generate such a model by comprehen-
sively instrumenting all middleware for communication, scheduling, and/or synchro-
nization to record component interactions [3, 7, 36, 58, 76, 78, 87]. This is a reasonable
assumption if the software architecture is homogeneous; for instance, Dapper [87] in-
struments a small set of middleware components that are widely used within Google.
However, many systems are like the Facebook systems we study; they grow organ-
ically over time in a culture that favors innovation over standardization (e.g., “move
fast and break things” is a well-known Facebook slogan). There is broad diversity
in programming languages, communication middleware, execution environments, and
scheduling mechanisms. Adding instrumentation retroactively to such an infrastruc-
ture is a Herculean task. Further, the end-to-end pipeline includes client software
such as Web browsers, and adding detailed instrumentation to all such software is
not feasible.
Other prior systems rely on a user-supplied schema that expresses the causal model
of application behavior [13, 91]. This approach runs afoul of the scale of modern
Internet services. To obtain a detailed model of end-to-end request processing, one
must assemble the collective knowledge of hundreds of programmers responsible for
the individual components that are involved in request processing. Further, any such
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model soon grows stale due to the constant evolution of the system under observation,
and so constant updating is required.
3.2 Life of a Facebook request
In the early days of the Web, a request could often be modeled as a single logical
thread of control in which a client executed an RPC to a single Web server. Those
halcyon days are over.
At Facebook, the end-to-end path from button click to final render spans a diverse
set of systems. Many components of the request are under Facebook’s control, but
several components are not (e.g., the external network and the client’s Web browser).
Yet, users care little about who is responsible for each component; they simply desire
that their content loads with acceptable delay.
A request begins on a client with a user action to retrieve some piece of content
(e.g., a news feed). After DNS resolution, the request is routed to an Edge Load
Balancer (ELB) [52]. ELBs are geo-distributed so as to allow TCP sessions to be
established closer to the user and avoid excessive latency during TCP handshake and
SSL termination. ELBs also provide a point of indirection for better load balancing,
acting as a proxy between the user and data center.
Once a request is routed to a particular data center, a Software Load Balancer
routes it to one of many possible Web servers, each of which runs the HipHop Virtual
Machine runtime [98]. Request execution on the Web server triggers many RPCs to
caching layers that include Memcache [64] and TAO [16]. Requests also occasionally
access databases.
RPC responses pass through the load-balancing layers on their way back to the
client. On the client, the exact order and manner of rendering a Web page are
dependent on the implementation details of the user’s browser. However, in general,
there will be a Cascading Style Sheet (CSS) download stage and a Document Object
33
Model rendering stage, followed by a JavaScript execution stage.
As with all modern Internet services, to achieve latency objectives, the handling
of an individual request exhibits a high degree of concurrency. Tens to hundreds
of individual components execute in parallel over a distributed set of computers,
including both server and client machines. Such concurrency makes performance
analysis and debugging complex. Fortunately, standard techniques such as critical
path analysis and slack analysis can tame this complexity. However, all such analyses
need a model of the causal dependencies in the system being analyzed. Our work fills
this need.
3.3 U¨berTrace: End-to-end Request Tracing
As discussed in the prior section, request execution at Facebook involves many
software components. Prior to our work, almost all of these components had logging
mechanisms used for debugging and optimizing the individual components. In fact,
our results show that individual components are almost always well-optimized when
considered in isolation.
Yet, there existed no complete and detailed instrumentation for monitoring the
end-to-end performance of Facebook requests. Such end-to-end monitoring is vital
because individual components can be well-optimized in isolation yet still miss oppor-
tunities to improve performance when components interact. Indeed, the opportunities
for performance improvement we identify all involve the interaction of multiple com-
ponents.
Thus, the first step in our work was to unify the individual logging systems at
Facebook into a single end-to-end performance tracing tool, dubbed U¨berTrace. Our
basic approach is to define a minimal schema for the information contained in a log
message, and then map existing log messages to that schema.
U¨berTrace requires that log messages contain at least:
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1. A unique request identifier.
2. The executing computer (e.g., the client or a particular server)
3. A timestamp that uses the local clock of the executing computer
4. An event name (e.g., “start of DOM rendering”).
5. A task name, where a task is defined to be a distributed thread of control.
U¨berTrace requires that each <event, task> tuple is unique, which implies that
there are no cycles that would cause a tuple to appear multiple times. Although this
assumption is not valid for all execution environments, it holds at Facebook given
how requests are processed. We believe that it is also a reasonable assumption for
similar Internet service pipelines.
Since all log timestamps are in relation to local clocks, U¨berTrace translates them
to estimated global clock values by compensating for clock skew. U¨berTrace looks for
the common RPC pattern of communication in which the thread of control in an indi-
vidual task passes from one computer (called the client to simplify this explanation)
to another, executes on the second computer (called the server), and returns to the
client. U¨berTrace calculates the server execution time by subtracting the latest and
earliest server timestamps (according to the server’s local clock) nested within the
client RPC. It then calculates the client-observed execution time by subtracting the
client timestamps that immediately succeed and precede the RPC. The difference be-
tween the client and server intervals is the estimated network round-trip time (RTT)
between the client and server. By assuming that request and response delays are
symmetric, U¨berTrace calculates clock skew such that, after clock-skew adjustment,
the first server timestamp in the pattern is exactly 1/2 RTT after the previous client
timestamp for the task.
The above methodology is subject to normal variation in network performance.
In addition, the imprecision of using existing log messages rather than instrument-
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ing communication points can add uncertainty. For instance, the first logged server
message could occur only after substantial server execution has already completed,
leading to an under-estimation of server processing time and an over-estimation of
RTT. U¨berTrace compensates by calculating multiple estimates. Since there are many
request and response messages during the processing of a higher-level request, it makes
separate RTT and clock skew calculations for each pair in the cross-product of re-
quests. It then uses the calculation that yields the lowest observed RTT.
Timecard [77] used a similar approach to reconcile timestamps and identified the
need to account for the effects of TCP slow start. Our use of multiple RTT estimates
accomplishes this. Some messages such as the initial request are a single packet and
so are not affected by slow start. Other messages such as the later responses occur
after slow start has terminated. Pairing two such messages will therefore yield a
lower RTT estimate. Since we take the minimum of the observed RTTs and use its
corresponding skew estimate, we get an estimate that is not perturbed by slow start.
Due to performance considerations, Facebook logging systems use statistical sam-
pling to monitor only a small percentage of requests. U¨berTrace must ensure that
the individual logging systems choose the same set of requests to monitor; otherwise
the probability of all logging systems independently choosing to monitor the same
request would be vanishingly small, making it infeasible to build a detailed picture
of end-to-end latency. Therefore, U¨berTrace propagates the decision about whether
or not to monitor a request from the initial logging component that makes such a
decision through all logging systems along the path of the request, ensuring that the
request is completely logged. The decision to log a request is made when the request
is received at the Facebook Web server; the decision is included as part of the per-
request metadata that is read by all subsequent components. U¨berTrace uses a global
identifier to collect the individual log messages, extracts the data items enumerated
above, and stores each message as a record in a relational database.
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We made minimal changes to existing logging systems in order to map existing
log messages to the U¨berTrace schema. We modified log messages to use the same
global identifier, and we made the event or task name more human-readable. We
added no additional log messages. Because we reused existing component logging
and required only a minimal schema, these logging changes required approximately
one person-month of effort.
3.4 The Mystery Machine
The Mystery Machine uses the traces generated by U¨berTrace to create a causal
model of how software components interact during the end-to-end processing of a
Facebook request. It then uses the causal model to perform several types of dis-
tributed systems performance analysis: finding the critical path, quantifying slack
for segments not on the critical path, and identifying segments that are correlated
with performance anomalies. The Mystery Machine enables more targeted analysis
by exporting its results through a relational database and graphical query tools.
3.4.1 Causal Relationships Model
To generate a causal model, The Mystery Machine first transforms each trace
from a collection of logged events to a collection of segments, which we define to
be the execution interval between two consecutive logged events for the same task.
A segment is labeled by the tuple <task, start event, end event>, and the segment
duration is the time interval between the two events.
Next, The Mystery Machine identifies causal relationships. Currently, it looks for
three types of relationships:
1. Happens-before (→) We say that segment A happens-before segment B (A
→ B) if the start event timestamp for B is greater than or equal to the end
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Figure 3.1: Causal Relationships. This figure depicts examples of the three kinds
of causal relationship we consider. Happens-before relationships are when one seg-
ment (A) always finishes in its entirety before another segment (B) begins. FIFO
relationships exist when a sequence of segments each have a happens-before relation-
ship with another sequence in the same order. A mutual exclusion relationship exists
when two segments never overlap.
event timestamp for A in all requests.
2. Mutual exclusion (∨) Segments A and B are mutually exclusive (A ∨ B) if
their time intervals never overlap.
3. Pipeline () Given two tasks, t1 and t2, there exists a data dependency
between pairs of segments of the two tasks. Further, the segment that operates
on data element d1 precedes the segment that operates on data element d2 in
task t1 if and only if the segment that operates on d1 precedes the segment that
operates on d2 in task t2 for all such pairs of segments. In other words, the
segments preserve a FIFO ordering in how data is produced by the first task
and consumed by the second task.
We summarize these relationships in Figure 3.1. For each relationship we provide a
valid example and at least one counterexample that would contradict the hypothesis.
We use techniques from the race detection literature to map these static relation-
ships to dynamic happens-before relationships. Note that mutual exclusion is a static
property; e.g., two components A and B that share a lock are mutually exclusive.
Dynamically, for a particular request, this relationship becomes a happens-before re-
38
S1 N1 C1
S2 N2 C2
S1 N1 C1
S2 N2 C2
S1 N1 C1
S2 N2 C2
Timing
Model
No Traces After Trace 1 After Trace 2
S1 N1 C1
S2 N2 C2
S1 N1 C1
S2 N2 C2
S1 N1 C1
S2 N2 C2
S1 N1 C1
S2 N2 C2
S1 N1 C1
S2 N2 C2
S1 N1 C1
S2 N2 C2
Critical Path of Trace 1 Critical Path of Trace 2
S1 N1 C1
S2 N2 C2
Refined Model
Timing
Model
Step 2: Calculate critical path of dependency graph through longest path analysis
Step 1: Refine dependency graph with counter examples 
Critical Path
t
t
Figure 3.2: Dependency model generation and critical path calculation. This
figure provides an example of discovering the true dependency model through iterative
refinement. We show only a few segments and relationships for the sake of simplicity.
Without any traces, the dependency model is a fully connected graph. By eliminating
dependency edges invalidated by counterexamples, we arrive at the true model. With
a refined model, we can reprocess the same traces and derive the critical path for
each.
lationship: either A → B or B → A, depending on the order of execution. Pipeline
relationships are similar. Thus, for any given request, all of these static relationships
can be expressed as dynamic causal relationships between pairs of segments.
3.4.2 Algorithm
The Mystery Machine uses iterative refinement to infer causal relationships. It first
generates all possible hypotheses for causal relationships among segments. Then, it
iterates through a corpus of traces and rejects a hypothesis if it finds a counterexample
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in any trace.
Step 1 of Figure 3.2 illustrates this process. We depict the set of hypotheses as
a graph where nodes are segments (”S” nodes are server segments, ”N” nodes are
network segments and ”C” nodes are client segments) and edges are hypothesized
relationships. For the sake of simplicity, we restrict this example to consider only
happens-before relationships; an arrow from A to B shows a hypothesized “A happens
before B” relationship.
The “No Traces” column shows that all possible relationships are initially hypoth-
esized; this is a large number because the possible relationships scale quadratically
as the number of segments increases. Several hypotheses are eliminated by observed
contradictions in the first request. For example, since S2 happens after S1, the hy-
pothesized relationship, S2 → S1, is removed. Further traces must be processed to
complete the model. For instance, the second request eliminates the hypothesized
relationship, N1 → N2. Additional traces prune new hypotheses due to the natural
perturbation in timing of segment processing; e.g., perhaps the second user had less
friends, allowing the network segments to overlap due to shorter server processing
time.
The Mystery Machine assumes that the natural variation in timing that arises over
large numbers of traces is sufficient to expose counterexamples for incorrect relation-
ships. Figure 3.3 provides evidence supporting this hypothesis from traces of over 1.3
million requests to the Facebook home page gathered over 30 days. As the number of
traces analyzed increases, the observation of new counterexamples diminishes, leaving
behind only true relationships. Note that the number of total relationships changes
over time because developers are continually adding new segments to the pipeline.
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Figure 3.3: Hypothesis Refinement. This graph shows the growth of number of
hypothesized relationships as a function of requests analyzed. As more requests are
analyzed, the rate at which new relationships are discovered and removed decreases
and eventually reaches a steady-state. The total number of relationships increases
over time due to code changes and the addition of new features.
3.4.3 Validation
To validate the causal model produced by the Mystery Machine, we confirmed
several specific relationships identified by the Mystery Machine. Although we could
not validate the entire model due to its size, we did substantial validation of two of the
more intricate components: the interplay between JavaScript execution on the client
and the dependencies involved in delivering data to the client. These components
have 42 and 84 segments, respectively, as well as 2,583 and 10,458 identified casual
relationships.
We confirmed these specific relationships by examining source code, inserting as-
sertions to confirm model-derived hypotheses, and consulting relevant subsystem ex-
perts. For example, the system discovered the specific, pipelined schedule according
to which page content is delivered to the client. Further, the model correctly reflects
that JavaScript segments are mutually exclusive (a known property of the JavaScript
execution engine) and identified ordering constraints arising from synchronization.
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3.4.4 Analysis
Once The Mystery Machine has produced the causal model of segment relation-
ships, it can perform several types of performance analysis.
3.4.5 Critical Path
Critical path analysis is a classic technique for understanding how individual com-
ponents of a parallel execution impact end-to-end latency [76, 95]. The critical path is
defined to be the set of segments for which a differential increase in segment execution
time would result in the same differential increase in end-to-end latency.
The Mystery Machine calculates the critical path on a per-request basis. It rep-
resents all segments in a request as a directed acyclic graph in which the segments
are vertices with weight equal to the segment duration. It adds an edge between all
vertices for which the corresponding segments have a causal relationship. Then, it
performs a transitive reduction in which all edges A → C are recursively removed if
there exists a path consisting of A → B and B → C that links the two nodes.
Finally, The Mystery Machine performs a longest-path analysis to find the critical
path from the first event in the request (the initiation of the request) to the last event
(which is typically the termination of some JavaScript execution). The length of the
critical path is the end-to-end latency of the entire request. If there are equal-length
critical paths, the first discovered path is chosen.
We illustrate the critical path calculation for the two example requests in Step 2
of Figure 3.2. Each request has a different critical path even though the dependency
graph is the same for both. The critical path of the first request is {S1, S2, N2, C2}.
Because S2 has a long duration, all dependencies for N2 and C2 have been met before
they start, leaving them on the critical path. The critical path of the second request
is {S1, N1, C1, C2}. In this case, S2 and N2 could have longer durations and not
affect end-to-end latency because C2 must wait for C1 to finish.
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Typically, we ask The Mystery Machine to calculate critical paths for large num-
bers of traces and aggregate the results. For instance, we might ask how often a
given segment falls on the critical path or the average percentage of the critical path
represented by each segment.
3.4.6 Slack
Critical path analysis is useful for determining where to focus optimization effort;
however, it does not provide any information about the importance of latency for
segments off the critical path. The Mystery Machine provides this information via
slack analysis.
We define slack to be the amount by which the duration of a segment may increase
without increasing the end-to-end latency of the request, assuming that the duration
of all other segments remains constant. By this definition, segments on the criti-
cal path have no slack because increasing their latency will increase the end-to-end
latency of the request.
To calculate the slack for a given segment, S, The Mystery Machine calculates
CPstart, the critical path length from the first event in the request to the start of S
and CPend the critical path length from the end of S to the last event in the request.
Given the critical path length for the entire request (CP ) and the duration of segment
S (DS), the slack for S is CP - CPstart - DS - CPend. The Mystery Machine’s slack
analysis calculates and reports this value for every segment. As with critical path
results, slack results are typically aggregated over a large number of traces.
3.4.7 Anomaly detection
One special form of aggregation supported by The Mystery Machine is anomaly
analysis. To perform this analysis, it first classifies requests according to end-to-end
latency to identify a set of outlier requests. Currently, outliers are defined to be
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Figure 3.4: The Mystery Machine data pipeline.
requests that are in the top 5% of end-to-end latency. Then, it performs a separate
aggregation of critical path or slack data for each set of requests identified by the
classifiers. Finally, it performs a differential comparison to identify segments with
proportionally greater representation in the outlier set of requests than in the non-
outlier set. For instance, we have used this analysis to identify a set of segments
that correlated with high latency requests. Inspection revealed that these segments
were in fact debugging components that had been returned in response to some user
requests.
3.5 Implementation
We designed The Mystery Machine to automatically and continuously analyze
production traffic at scale over long time periods. It is implemented as a large-scale
data processing pipeline, as depicted in Figure 3.4.
U¨berTrace continuously samples a small fraction of requests for end-to-end tracing.
Trace data is collected by the Web servers handling these requests, which write them
to Scribe, Facebook’s distributed logging service. The trace logs are stored in tables
in a large-scale data warehousing infrastructure called Hive [90]. While Scribe and
Hive are the in-house analysis tools used at Facebook, their use is not fundamental
to our system.
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The Mystery Machine runs periodic processing jobs that read trace data from Hive
and calculate or refine the causal model based on those traces. The calculation of
the causal model is compute-intensive because the number of possible hypotheses is
quadratic with the number of segments and because model refinement requires traces
of hundreds of thousands of requests. Therefore, our implementation parallelizes this
step as a Hadoop job running on a compute cluster. Infrequently occurring testing and
debugging segments are automatically removed from the model; these follow a well-
defined naming convention that can be detected with a single regular expression. The
initial calculation of the model analyzed traces of over 1.3 million requests collected
over 30 days. On a Hadoop cluster, it took less than 2 hours to derive a model from
these traces.
In practice, the model must be recomputed periodically in order to detect changes
in relationships. Parallelizing the computation made it feasible to recompute the
model every night as a regularly-scheduled batch job.
In addition to the three types of analysis described above, The Mystery Machine
supports on-demand user queries by exporting results to Facebook’s in-house analytic
tools, which can aggregate, pivot, and drill down into the results. We used these
tools to categorize results by browser, connection speed, and other such dimensions;
we share some of this data in Section 3.7.
3.6 Discussion
A key characteristic of The Mystery Machine is that it discovers dependencies
automatically, which is critical because Facebook’s request processing is constantly
evolving. As described previously, The Mystery Machine assumes a hypothesized
relationship between two segments until it finds a counterexample. Over time, new
segments are added as the site evolves and new features are added. The Mystery
Machine automatically finds the dependencies introduced by the new segments by
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hypothesizing new possible relationships and removing relationships in which a coun-
terexample is found. This is shown in Figure 3.3 by the increase in number of total
relationships over time. To account for segments that are eliminated and invariants
that are added, one can simply run a new Hadoop job to generate the model over a
different time window of traces.
Excluding new segments, the rate at which new relationships are added levels off.
The rate at which relationships are removed due to counterexamples also levels off.
Thus, the model converges on a set of true dependencies.
The Mystery Machine relies on U¨berTrace for complete log messages. Log mes-
sages, however, may be missing for two reasons: the component does no logging at all
for a segment of its execution or the component logs messages for some requests but
not others. In the first case, The Mystery Machine cannot identify causal relationships
involving the unlogged segment, but causal relationships among all other segments
will be identified correctly. When a segment is missing, the model overestimates the
concurrency in the system, which would affect the critical path/slack analysis if the
true critical path includes the unlogged segment. In the second case, The Mystery
Machine would require more traces in order to discover counterexamples. This is
equivalent to changing the sampling frequency.
3.7 Results
We demonstrate the utility of The Mystery Machine with two case studies. First,
we demonstrate its use for aggregate performance characterization. We study live
traffic, stratifying the data to identify factors that influence which system components
contribute to the critical path. We find that the critical path can shift between three
major components (servers, network, and client) and that these shifts correlate with
the client type and network connection quality.
This variation suggests one possible performance optimization for Facebook
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servers: provide differentiated service by prioritizing service for connections where
the server has no slack while deprioritizing those where network and client latency
will likely dominate. Our second case study demonstrates how the natural variance
across a large trace set enables testing of such performance hypotheses without ex-
pensive modifications to the system under observation. Since an implementation that
provided differential services would require large-scale effort to thread through hun-
dreds of server components, we use our dataset to first determine whether such an
optimization is likely to be successful. We find that slack, as detected by The Mys-
tery Machine, indeed indicates that slower server processing time minimally impacts
end-to-end latency. We also find that slack tends to remain stable for a particular
user across multiple Facebook sessions, so the observed slack of past connections can
be used to predict the slack of the current connection.
3.8 Characterizing End-to-End Performance
In our first case study, we characterize the end-to-end performance critical path
of Web accesses to the home.php Facebook endpoint. The Mystery Machine analyzes
traces of over 1.3 million Web accesses collected over 30 days in July and August
2013.
Importance of critical path analysis. Figure 3.5 shows mean time breakdowns
over the entire trace dataset. The breakdown is shown in absolute time in the left
graph, and as a percent of total time on the right. We assign segments to one of
five categories: Server for segments on a Facebook Web server or any internal service
accessed from the Web server over RPC, Network for segments in which data traverses
the network, DOM for browser segments that parse the document object model,
CSS for segments processing cascading style sheets, and JavaScript for JavaScript
segments. Each graph includes two bars: one showing the stacked sum of total
processing time in each component ignoring all concurrency (“Summed Delay”) and
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Figure 3.5: Mean End-to-End Performance Breakdown. Simply summing delay
measured at each system component (“Summed Delay”) ignores overlap and under-
estimates the importance of server latency relative to the actual mean critical path
(“Critical Path”).
the other the critical path as identified by The Mystery Machine (“Critical Path”).
On average, network delays account for the largest fraction of the critical path,
but client and server processing are both significant. JavaScript execution remains a
major bottleneck in current Web browsers, particularly since the JavaScript execution
model admits little concurrency. The comparison of the total delay and critical path
bars reveals the importance of The Mystery Machine—by examining only the total
latency breakdown (e.g., if an engineer were profiling only one system component),
one might overestimate the importance of network latency and JavaScript processing
on end-to-end performance. In fact, the server and other client processing segments
are frequently critical, and the overall critical path is relatively balanced across server,
client, and network.
High variance in the critical path. Although analyzing the average case is
instructive, it grossly oversimplifies the performance picture for the home.php end-
point. There are massive sources of latency variance over the population of requests,
including the performance of the client device, the size of the user’s friend list, the
kind of network connection, server load, Memcache misses, etc. Figure 3.6 shows
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Figure 3.6: Cumulative distribution of the fraction of the critical path at-
tributable to server, network, and client portions
the cumulative distribution of the fraction of the critical path attributable to server,
network, and client segments over all requests. The key revelation of these distri-
butions is that the critical path shifts drastically across requests—any of the three
components can dominate delay, accounting for more than half of the critical path in
a non-negligible fraction of requests.
Variance is greatest in the contribution of the network to the critical path, as
evidenced by the fact that its CDF has the least curvature. It is not surprising that
network delays vary so greatly since the trace data set includes accesses to Facebook
over all sorts of networks, from high-speed broadband to cellular networks and even
some dial-up connections. Client processing always accounts for at least 20% of the
critical path. After content delivery, there is a global barrier in the browser before
the JavaScript engine begins running the executable components of the page, hence,
JavaScript execution is a factor in performance measurement. However, the client
rarely accounts for more than 40% of the critical path. It is unusual for the server to
account for less than 20% of the critical path because the initial request processing
before the server begins to transmit any data is always critical. Noticing this high
variance in the critical path was very valuable to us because it triggered the idea of
differentiated services that we explore in Section 3.9.
Stratification by connection type. We first consider stratifying by the type
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Figure 3.7: Critical path breakdowns stratified by browser, platform, con-
nection type, and computed bandwidth
of network over which a user connects to Facebook’s system, as it is clear one would
expect network latency to differ, for example, between cable modem and wireless
connections. Facebook’s edge load balancing system tags each incoming request with
a network type. These tags are derived from the network type recorded in the Au-
tonomous System Number database for the Internet service provider responsible for
the originating IP address. Figure 3.7 illustrates the critical path breakdown, in ab-
solute time, for the four largest connection type categories. Each bar is annotated
with the fraction of all requests that fall within that connection type (only a subset
of connection types are shown, so the percentages do not sum to 100%).
Perhaps unsurprisingly, these coarse network type classifications correlate only
loosely to the actual performance of the network connection. Mobile connections
show a higher average network critical path than the other displayed connection
types, but the data is otherwise inconclusive. We conclude that the network type
reported by the ASN is not very helpful for making performance predictions.
Stratification by client platform. The client platform is included in the HTTP
headers transmitted by the browser along with each request, and is therefore also
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available at the beginning of request processing. The client operating system is a hint
to the kind of client device, which in turn may suggest relative client performance.
Figure 3.7 shows a critical path breakdown for the five most common client platforms
in our traces, again annotated with the fraction of requests represented by the bar.
Note that we are considering only Web browser requests, so requests initiated by
Facebook cell phone apps are not included. The most striking feature of the graph is
that Mac OS X users (a small minority of Facebook connections at only 7.1%) tend
to connect to Facebook from faster networks than Windows users. We also see that
the bulk of connecting Windows users still run Windows 7, and many installations
of Windows XP remain deployed. Client processing time has improved markedly
over the various generations of Windows. Nevertheless, the breakdowns are all quite
similar, and we again find insufficient predictive power for differentiating service time
by platform.
Stratification by browser. The browser type is also indicated in the HTTP
headers transmitted with a request. In Figure 3.7, we see critical paths for the four
most popular browsers. Safari is an outlier, but this category is strongly correlated
with the Mac OS X category. Chrome appears to offer slightly better JavaScript
performance than the other browsers.
Stratification by measured network bandwidth. All of the preceding strat-
ifications only loosely correlate to performance—ASN is a poor indication of network
connection quality, and browser and OS do not provide a reliable indication of client
performance. We provide one more example stratification where we subdivide the
population of requests into five categories directly from the measured network band-
width, which can be deduced from our traces based on network time and bytes trans-
mitted. Each of the categories are equally sized to represent 20% of requests, sorted
by increasing bandwidth (p80 is the quintile with the highest observed bandwidth).
As one would expect, network critical path is strongly correlated to measured net-
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work bandwidth. Higher bandwidth connections also tend to come from more capable
clients; low-performance clients (e.g., smart phones) often connect over poor networks
(3G and Edge networks).
3.9 Differentiated Service using Slack
Our second case study uses The Mystery Machine to perform early exploration of
a potential performance optimization—differentiated service—without undertaking
the expense of implementing the optimization.
The characterization in the preceding section reveals that there is enormous vari-
ation in the relative importance of client, server, and network performance over the
population of Facebook requests. For some requests, server segments form the bulk
of the critical path. For these requests, any increase in server latency will result in a
commensurate increase in end-to-end latency and a worse user experience. However,
after the initial critical segment, many connections are limited by the speed at which
data can be delivered over the network or rendered by the client. For these connec-
tions, server execution can be delayed to produce data as needed, rather than as soon
as possible, without affecting the critical path or the end-to-end request latency.
We use The Mystery Machine to directly measure the slack in server processing
time available in our trace dataset. For simplicity of explanation, we will use the
generic term “slack” in this section to refer to the slack in server processing time
only, excluding slack available in any other types of segments.
Figure 3.8 shows the cumulative distribution of slack for the last data item sent
by the server to the client. The graph is annotated with a vertical line at 500 ms of
slack. For the purposes of this analysis, we have selected 500 ms as a reasonable cut-off
between connections for which service should be provided with best effort (< 500 ms
slack), and connections for which service can be deprioritized (> 500 ms). However,
in practice, the best cut-off will depend on the implementation mechanism used to
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Figure 3.8: Slack CDF for Last Data Item. Nearly 20% of traces exhibit consid-
erable slack—over 2 s—for the server segment that generates the last pagelet trans-
mitted to the client. Conversely, nearly 20% of traces exhibit little (< 250 ms) slack.
deprioritize service. More than 60% of all connections exhibit more than 500 ms of
slack, indicating substantial opportunity to defer server processing. We find that slack
typically increases monotonically during server processing as data items are sent to
the client during a request. Thus, we conclude that slack is best consumed equally
as several segments execute, as opposed to consuming all slack at the start or end of
processing.
Validating Slack Estimates It is difficult to directly validate The Mystery Ma-
chine’s slack estimates, as we can only compute slack once a request has been fully
processed. Hence, we cannot retrospectively delay server segments to consume the
slack and confirm that the end-to-end latency is unchanged. Such an experiment is
difficult even under highly controlled circumstances, since it would require precisely
reproducing the conditions of a request over and over while selectively delaying only
a few server segments.
Instead, we turn again to the vastness of our trace data set and the natural variance
therein to confirm that slack estimates hold predictive power. Intuitively, small slack
implies that server latency is strongly correlated to end-to-end latency; indeed, with
a slack of zero we expect any increase in server latency to delay end-to-end latency by
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Figure 3.9: Server vs. End-to-end Latency. For the traces with slack below 25ms
(left graph), there is strong correlation (clustering near y = x) between server and
end-to-end latency. The correlation is much weaker (wide dispersal above y = x) for
the traces with slack above 2.5s (right graph).
the same amount. Conversely, when slack is large, we expect little correlation between
server latency and end-to-end latency; increases in server latency are largely hidden
by other concurrent delays. We validate our notion of slack by directly measuring the
correlation of server and end-to-end latency.
Figure 3.9 provides an intuitive view of the relationship for which we are testing.
Each graph is a heat map of server generation time vs. end-to-end latency. The left
graph includes only requests with the lowest measured slack, below 25 ms. There are
slightly over 115,000 such requests in this data set. For these requests, we expect a
strong correlation between server time and end-to-end time. We find that this subset
of requests is tightly clustered just above the y = x (indicated by the line in the
figure), indicating a strong correlation. The right figure includes roughly 100,000
requests with the greatest slack (above 2500 ms). For these, we expect no particular
relationship between server time and end-to-end time (except that end-to-end time
must be at least as large as slack, since this is an invariant of request processing).
Indeed, we find the requests dispersed in a large cloud above y = x, with no correlation
visually apparent.
We provide a more rigorous validation of the slack estimate in Figure 3.10. Here,
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Figure 3.10: Server–End-to-end Latency Correlation vs. Slack. As reported
slack increases, the correlation between total server processing time and end-to-end
latency weakens, since a growing fraction of server segments are non-critical.
we show the correlation coefficient between server time and end-to-end time for equally
sized buckets of requests sorted by increasing slack. Each block in the graph corre-
sponds to 5% of our sample, or roughly 57,000 requests (buckets are not equally
spaced since the slack distribution is heavy-tailed). As expected, the correlation co-
efficient between server and end-to-end latency is quite high, nearly 0.8, when slack
is low. It drops to 0.2 for the requests with the largest slack.
Predicting Slack. We have found that slack is predictive of the degree to which
server latency impacts end-to-end latency. However, The Mystery Machine can dis-
cover slack only through a retrospective analysis. To be useful in a deployed system,
we must predict the availability or lack of slack for a particular connection as server
processing begins.
One mechanism to predict slack is to recall the slack a particular user experienced
in a prior connection to Facebook. Previous slack was found to be more useful in
predicting future slack than any other feature we studied. Most users connect to
Facebook using the same device and over the same network connection repeatedly.
Hence, their client and network performance are likely to remain stable over time.
The user id is included as part of the request, and slack could be easily associated
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Figure 3.11: Historical Slack as Classifier. The clustering around the line y = x
shows that slack is relatively stable over time. The history-based classifier is correct
83% of the time. A type I error is a false positive, reporting slack as available when
it is not. A type II error is a false negative.
with the user id via a persistent cookie or by storing the most recent slack estimate
in Memcache [64].
We test the hypothesis that slack remains stable over time by finding all instances
within our trace dataset where we have multiple requests associated with the same
user id. Since the request sampling rate is exceedingly low, and the active user
population is so large, selecting the same user for tracing more than once is a relatively
rare event. Nevertheless, again because of the massive volume of traces collected over
the course of 30 days of sampling, we have traced more than 1000 repeat users. We
test a simple classifier that predicts a user will experience a slack greater than 500 ms
if the slack on their most recent preceding connection was also greater than 500 ms.
Figure 3.11 illustrates the result. The graph shows a scatter plot of the first slack and
second slack in each pair; the line at y = x indicates slack was identical between the
two connections. Our simple history-based classifier predicts the presence or absence
of slack correctly 83% of the time. The shaded regions of the graph indicate cases
where we have misclassified a connection. A type I error indicates a prediction that
there is slack available for a connection when in fact server performance turns out to
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be critical–8% of requests fall in this category. Conversely, a type II error indicates a
prediction that a connection will not have slack when in fact it does, and represents
a missed opportunity to throttle service—9% of requests fall in this category.
Note that achieving these results does not require frequent sampling. The repeated
accesses we study are often several weeks separated in time, and, of course, it is
likely that there have been many intervening unsampled requests by the same user.
Sampling each user once every few weeks would therefore be sufficient.
Potential Impact. We have shown that a potential performance optimization
would be to offer differentiated service based on the predicted amount of slack avail-
able per connection. Deciding which connections to service is equivalent to real-time
scheduling with deadlines. By using predicted slack as a scheduling deadline, we can
improve average response time in a manner similar to the earliest deadline first real-
time scheduling algorithm. Connections with considerable slack can be given a lower
priority without affecting end-to-end latency. However, connections with little slack
should see an improvement in end-to-end latency because they are given scheduling
priority. Therefore, average latency should improve. We have also shown that prior
slack values are a good predictor of future slack. When new connections are received,
historical values can be retrieved and used in scheduling decisions. Since calculating
slack is much less complex than servicing the actual Facebook request, it should be
feasible to recalculate the slack for each user approximately once per month.
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CHAPTER IV
DQBarge: Improving data quality tradeoffs in
Internet services
4.1 Introduction
A data-quality tradeoff is an explicit decision by a software component to return
lower-fidelity data in order to improve response time or minimize resource usage.
Data-quality tradeoffs are often found in Internet services due to the need to balance
the competing goals of minimizing the service response time perceived by the end
user and maximizing the quality of the service provided. Tradeoffs in large-scale
services are pervasive since hundreds or thousands of distinct software components
may be invoked to service a single request, and each component may make individual
data-quality tradeoffs.
Data-quality tradeoffs in low-level software components often arise from defensive
programming. A programmer or team responsible for a specific component wishes to
bound the response time of their component even when the resource usage or latency
of a sub-service is unpredictable. For instance, a common practice is to time out
when a sub-service is slow to respond and supply a lower-fidelity value in lieu of the
requested data.
To quantify the prevalence of data-quality tradeoffs, we undertake a systematic
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study of software components at Facebook. We find that over 90% of components
perform data-quality tradeoffs instead of failing. Some tradeoffs we observe are using
default values, calculating aggregates from only a subset of input values, and retriev-
ing alternate values from a stale or lower-quality data source. Further, we observe
that the vast majority of data-quality tradeoffs are reactive rather than proactive,
e.g., components typically set timeouts and make a data-quality tradeoff when a
timer expires rather than attempt to predict and perform only those actions that can
be performed within a desired time bound.
These existing data-quality tradeoffs are suboptimal for three reasons. First, they
consider only local knowledge available to the low-level software component because
of the difficulty in accessing higher-level knowledge such as the provenance of data,
system load, and whether the component is on the critical request path. Second, the
tradeoffs are usually reactive (e.g., happening only after a timeout) rather than proac-
tive (e.g., issuing only the amount of sub-service requests that can be expected to
complete within a time bound); reactive tradeoffs waste resources and exacerbate sys-
tem overload. Finally, there is no mechanism to trace the set of data-quality tradeoffs
made during a request, and this makes understanding the quality and performance
impact of such tradeoffs on actual requests difficult.
DQBarge addresses these problems by propagating critical information related to
data-quality tradeoffs along the causal path of request processing. The propagated
data includes load metrics, as well as the expected critical path and slack for individual
software components. It also includes provenance for request data such as the data
sources queried and the software components that have transformed the data. Finally,
it includes the specific data-quality tradeoffs that have been made for each request;
e.g., data values left out of aggregations.
DQBarge uses this data to generate performance and quality models for low-level
tradeoffs in the service pipeline. It consults the models to proactively determine which
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tradeoffs to make for future requests.
DQBarge generates performance and quality models by sampling a small percent-
age of the total requests processed by the service and redundantly executing them
to compare the performance and quality when different tradeoffs are employed. Per-
formance models capture how throughput and latency are affected by specific data-
quality tradeoffs as a factor of overall system load and provenance. Quality models
capture how the fidelity of the final response is affected by specific tradeoffs as a
function of input data provenance.
These models enable better tradeoffs during subsequent request executions.
DQBarge passes extra data along the causal path of request processing. It pre-
dicts the critical path for each request and the components along the requests path
that will have substantial slack in processing time. It also measures current system
load. This global and request-specific state is attached to the request at ingress.
As the request propagates through software components, DQBarge annotates data
objects with provenance (e.g., the sources from which data was retrieved and the
algorithms used to generate the data). This information and the generated models
are propagated to the low-level components, enabling them to make better tradeoffs.
We investigate three scenarios in which better data-quality tradeoffs can help.
First, during unanticipated load spikes, making better data quality tradeoffs can
maintain end-to-end latency goals while minimizing the loss in fidelity perceived by
the end user. Second, when load levels permit, components with slack (because they
are off the critical path of request processing) can improve the fidelity of the response
without impacting the end-to-end latency. Finally, understanding the potential ef-
fects of low-level data-quality tradeoffs can inform dynamic capacity planning and
maximize utility as a function of the resources required to produce output.
Thus, this work makes the following contributions. We provide the first com-
prehensive study of low-level data-quality tradeoffs in a large-scale Internet service.
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Second, we observe that causal propagation of request statistics and provenance en-
ables better and more proactive data-quality tradeoffs. Finally, we demonstrate the
feasibility of this approach by designing, implementing, and evaluating DQBarge, an
end-to-end approach for tracing, modeling, and actuating data-quality tradeoffs in
Internet service pipelines.
We have added a complete, end-to-end implementation of DQBarge to Sirius [39],
an open-source, personal digital assistant service. We have also implemented and
evaluated the main components of the DQBarge architecture at Facebook and val-
idated it with production data. Our results show that DQBarge can meet latency
goals during load spikes, utilize spare resources without impacting end-to-end latency,
and maximize utility by dynamically adding capacity for a service.
4.2 Study of data-quality tradeoffs
In this section, we quantify the prevalence and type of data-quality tradeoffs in
production software at Facebook. We perform a comprehensive study of Facebook
client services that use an internal key-value store called Laser. Laser enables online
accessing of results of a batch offline computation such as a Hive [90] query.
We chose to study clients of Laser for several reasons. First, Laser had 463 client
services, giving us a broad base of software to examine. Second, many details about
timeouts and tradeoffs are specified in client-specific RPC configuration files for this
store. We were able to process these files automatically, which reduced the amount of
manual code inspection required for the study. Finally, we believe a key-value store
is representative of the low-level components employed by most large-scale Internet
companies.
Table 4.1 shows the results of our study for the 50 client services that invoke
Laser most frequently, and Table 4.2 shows the results for all 463 client services. We
categorize how clients make data-quality decisions along two dimensions: proactivity
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Failure Data-quality tradeoff
Default Omit Low fidelity
Reactive 5 14 30 1
Proactive 0 0 2 1
Table 4.1: Data-quality decisions of the top 50 Laser clients. Each box shows
the number of client services that make decisions according to the specified combina-
tion of reactive/proactive determination and resultant action. The total number of
values shown is greater than 50 since a few clients use more than one strategy.
Failure Data-quality tradeoff
Default Omit Low fidelity
Reactive 40 250 174 4
Proactive 0 3 7 1
Table 4.2: Data-quality decisions made by all Laser clients. Each box shows
the number of client services that make tradeoffs according to the specified combina-
tion of reactive/proactive determination and resultant action. The total number of
values shown is greater than 463 since a few clients use more than one strategy.
and resultant action. Each table entry lists the number of client services that make
at least one data quality decisions with a specific proactivity/action combination. We
find that most clients employ a single strategy for all of their requests; only a few use
different strategies for different requests. When a client uses multiple strategies, we
include it in all relevant categories. Thus, the total number of values in each table is
slightly more than the number of clients.
4.2.1 Proactivity
We consider a tradeoff to be reactive if the client service always initiates the request
and then uses a timeout or return code to determine if the request is taking too long
or consuming too many resources. For instance, we observed many latency-sensitive
clients that set a strict timeout for how long to wait for a response. If Laser takes
longer than the timeout, such clients make a data-quality tradeoff or return failure.
A proactive check predicts whether the expected latency or resource cost of pro-
cessing the request will exceed a threshold. If so, a data-quality tradeoff is made
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immediately without issuing the request. For example, we observed a client that
determines whether or not a query will require cross-data-center communication be-
cause such communication would cause it to exceed its latency bound. If there are no
hosts that can service the query in its data center, it makes a data-quality tradeoff.
4.2.2 Resultant actions
We also examine the actions taken in response to latency or resource usage ex-
ceeding a threshold. Failure shows the number of clients that require a response from
Laser. If the store responds with an error or timeout, the client service fails. Such
instances mean a programmer has chosen to not make a data-quality tradeoff.
The remaining categories represent different types of data-quality tradeoffs. De-
fault shows the number of client services that return a pre-defined default answer
when a tradeoff is made. For instance, we observed a client service that ranks chat
threads according to their activity level. The set of most active chat groups are re-
trieved from Laser and boosted to the top of a chat bar. If retrieving this set of active
chat groups fails or times out, chat groups and contacts are listed alphabetically.
The Omit category is common in client services that aggregate hundreds of values
from different sources; e.g., to generate a model. If an error or timeout occurs retriev-
ing values from one of these sources, those values are left out and the aggregation is
performed over the values that were retrieved successfully.
One specific example we observed is a recommendation engine that aggregates
candidates and features from several data sources. It is resilient to missing candi-
dates and features. Although missing candidates are excluded from the final rec-
ommendation and missing features negatively affect candidate scores in calculating
the recommendation, the exclusion of a portion of these values allows a usable, but
slightly lower-fidelity recommendation to be returned in a timely manner in the event
of failure or unexpected system load.
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The Low fidelity category denotes client services that make a tradeoff by retrieving
an alternate, reduced quality value from a different data source. For example, we
observed a client that requests a pre-computed list of top videos for a given user. If a
timeout or failure occurs retrieving this list, the client retrieves a more generic set of
videos for that user. As a further example, we observed a client that chooses among
a pre-ranked list of optimal data sources. On error or timeout, the client retrieves
the data from the next best data source. This process continues until a response is
received.
Before performing our study, we hypothesized that client services might try to
retrieve data of equal fidelity from an alternate data store in response to a failure.
However, we did not observe any instance of this behavior in our study (all alternate
sources had lower-fidelity data). Thus, we do not list this category in our results.
4.2.3 Discussion of results
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show that data quality tradeoffs are pervasive in the client
services we study. 90% of the top 50 Laser clients and 91% of all 463 clients perform
a data-quality tradeoff in response to a failure or timeout; the remaining 9-10% of
clients consider the failure to retrieve data in a timely manner to be a fatal error.
Thus, in the Facebook environment, making data-quality tradeoffs is normal behavior,
and failures are the exception.
For the top 50 clients, the most common action when faced with a failure or
timeout is to omit the requested value from the calculation of an aggregate (60% of
the top 50 clients do this). The next most common action (28% of the top 50 clients)
is to use a default value in lieu of the requested data. These trends are reversed when
considering all clients. Only 36% of all 463 clients omit the requested values from an
aggregation, whereas 52% use a default value.
We were surprised that only a few clients react to failure or timeout by attempting
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to retrieve the requested data from an alternate source (4% of the top 50 clients and
1% of all clients). This may be due to tight time or resource constraints; e.g., if the
original query takes too long, there may be no time left to initiate another query.
Only 6% of the top 50 clients and 2% of all clients are proactive. The lack of
proactivity represents a significant lost opportunity for optimization because requests
that timeout or fail consume resources but produce no benefit. This effect can be
especially prominent when requests are failing due to excessive load; a proactive
strategy would decrease the overall stress on the system. Failure of a proactive check
always results in a data-quality tradeoff rather than a failure; this makes sense because
it would be very pessimistic for a client to return a failure without at least attempting
to fetch the needed data.
In our inspection of source code, we observed that low-level data-quality decisions
are almost always encapsulated within clients and not reported to higher-level com-
ponents or attached to the response data. Thus, there is no way for operators to
check how the quality of the response being sent to the user has been impacted by
low-level quality tradeoffs during request processing.
4.3 Design and implementation
Motivated by our study results, we designed DQBarge to help developers under-
stand the impact of data-quality tradeoffs and make better, more proactive tradeoffs
to improve quality and performance. Our hypothesis is that propagating additional
information along the causal path of request processing will provide the additional
context necessary to reach these goals.
Section 4.3.1 describes how DQBarge gathers and propagates data about request
processing, including system load, critical path and slack predictions, data prove-
nance, and a history of the tradeoffs made during request processing. Section 4.3.2
relates how DQBarge duplicates the execution of a small sample of requests to build
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models of performance and quality for potential data-quality tradeoffs. As described
in Section 4.3.3, DQBarge uses these models to make better tradeoffs for subsequent
requests: it makes proactive tradeoffs to reduce resource wastage, and it uses prove-
nance to choose tradeoffs that lead to better quality at a reduced performance cost.
Finally, Section 4.3.4 describes how DQBarge logs all tradeoffs made during request
processing so that operators can review how system performance and request quality
have been impacted.
4.3.1 Data gathering and propagation
DQBarge provides a library for developers to specify the information that should
be propagated along the critical path. Developers use the library interface to annotate
objects during request processing and query those annotations at later stages of the
pipeline. The DQBarge library has a RPC-package-specific back-end that modifies
and queries existing RPC objects to propagate the information.
DQBarge modifies RPC objects by adding additional fields that contain data to
be propagated along the causal path. It supports three object scopes: request-level,
component-level, and data-level.
Request-level objects are passed through all components involved in processing
the request, following the causal path of request execution. For example, the systems
in our case studies both have a global object containing a unique request identi-
fier. DQBarge appends request-level information to this object. Request-level data
includes system-wide load metrics, slack predictions, and a list of data-quality trade-
offs made during request execution. This technique for passing and propagating
information is widely used in other tracing systems that follow the causal path of
execution [36, 57].
Component-level objects persist from the beginning to end of processing for a
specific software component within the request pipeline. Such objects are passed to all
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Figure 4.1: DQBarge overview.
sub-components that are called during the execution of the higher-level component.
DQBarge appends component-specific data to these objects, so such data will be
automatically deallocated when execution passes beyond the specified component.
Component-specific load metrics are one example of data put in component-level
objects.
Data-level objects are the specific data items being propagated as a result of
request execution. DQBarge associates provenance with each data item, since the
provenance is meaningful only as long as the data item exists.
Our library provide a useful interface for manipulating RPC objects, but devel-
opers must still make domain-specific decisions, e.g., what metrics and provenance
values to add, what objects to associate with those values, and what rules should be
used to model the propagation of provenance. Figure 4.1 shows an overview of how
this data propagates through the system.
Load metrics may be relevant to the entire request or only to certain components.
Each load metric is represented as a typed key-value pair (e.g., a floating point value
associated with the key “requests/second”). Currently supported load metrics are
throughput, CPU load, and memory usage.
Critical path and slack predictions are specified as directed acyclic graphs. Each
software component in the graph has a weight that corresponds to its predicted slack
(the amount of additional time it could take to process a request without affecting
the end-to-end latency of the request). Components on the critical path of request
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execution have zero slack. Currently, slack predictions are made at request ingress
based on historical log data; such predictions may cover the entire request or only
specific components of the request.
DQBarge associates provenance with the data objects it describes. Provenance
can be a data source or the algorithm employed to generate a particular object. Prove-
nance is represented as an unordered collection of typed key-value pairs. DQBarge
supports both discrete and continuous types. The types allow DQBarge to extract
a schema from the data objects being passed to a component making a data-quality
decision. Components are treated as black boxes, so developers must specify how
provenance is propagated when a component modifies existing data objects or cre-
ates new ones.
Finally, DQBarge stores the tradeoffs that were made during request processing in
a request-level object. As described in Section 4.3.4, this information may be logged
and used for reporting the effect of tradeoffs on quality and performance.
4.3.2 Model generation
For each potential tradeoff, DQBarge creates a performance model and a quality
model that capture how the tradeoff affects request execution. Performance models
predict how throughput and latency are affected by specific data-quality tradeoffs as
a factor of overall system load and the provenance of input data. Quality models
capture how the fidelity of the final response is affected by specific tradeoffs as a
function of provenance.
DQBarge uses request duplication to generate models from production traffic with-
out adversely affecting the user experience. At the RPC layer, it randomly samples
incoming requests from production traffic, and it routes a copy of the selected re-
quests to one or more request duplication pipelines. Such pipelines execute isolated,
redundant copies of the request for which DQBarge can make different data-quality
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tradeoffs. These pipelines do not return results to the end user and they are prevented
from making modifications to persistent stores in the production environment; in all
other respects, request execution is identical to production systems. Many production
systems, including those at Facebook, already have similar functionality for testing
purposes, so adding support for model generation required minimal code changes.
DQBarge controls the rate at which requests enter the duplication pipeline by
changing the sampling frequency. At each potential tradeoff site, software components
query DQBarge to determine which tradeoffs to make; DQBarge uses these hooks
to systematically explore different tradeoff combinations and generate models. At
the pipeline egress, DQBarge inserts meters that record both the request processing
latency and the final response, which it uses to calculate a service-specific measure of
quality.
To generate a performance model, DQBarge uses load testing [45]. Each data-
quality tradeoff offers multiple fidelities. A default value may be used or not. Different
types or percentages of values can be left out of an aggregation. Multiple alternate
data stores may be used. For each fidelity, DQBarge starts with a low request rate
and increases the request rate until the latency exceeds a threshold. Thus, the result-
ing model shows request processing latency as a function of request rate and tradeoffs
made (i.e., the fidelity of the tradeoff selected). DQBarge also records the prove-
nance of the input data for the component making the tradeoff; the distribution of
provenance is representative of production traffic since the requests in the duplica-
tion pipeline are a random sampling of that traffic. DQBarge determines whether the
resulting latency distribution varies as a result of the input provenance; if so, it gener-
ates separate models for each provenance category. However, in the systems we have
examined, provenance has not had a statistically significant effect on performance
(though it significantly affects quality).
Even though generating performance models is performed offline, there is still a
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non-trivial cost with producing these models. First, resources must be allocated in
order to understand and reach the full limits of the service. Additionally, performing a
parameter sweep of the request rate can take up to approximately an hour. Producing
the performance curves for each tradeoff rate can be done in parallel but at the expense
of additional resources. The request rate is held until the variance has settled so that
accurate measurements of performance in production can be gathered. For example,
for systems running on the JVM with a JIT, additional requests are needed to warm
up the system to accurately model the distribution of request latencies.
Quality models capture how the fidelity of the final response is affected by data-
quality tradeoffs during request processing. To generate a quality model, DQBarge
sends each request to two duplication pipelines. The first pipeline makes no trade-
offs, and so produces a full-fidelity response. The second pipeline makes a specified
tradeoff, and so produces a potentially lower-fidelity response. DQBarge measures
the quality impact of the tradeoff by comparing the two responses and applying a
service-specific quality ranking. For example, if the output of the request is a ranked
list of Web pages, then a service-specific quality metric might be the distance between
where pages appear in the two rankings.
DQBarge next learns a model of how provenance affects request quality. As de-
scribed in the previous section, input data objects to the component making the
tradeoff are annotated with provenance in the form of typed key-value pairs. These
pairs are the features in the quality model. DQBarge uses multidimensional linear
regression to model the importance of each provenance feature in the quality of the
request result. For example, if a data-quality tradeoff omits values from an aggrega-
tion, then omitting values from one data source may have less impact on response
quality than omitting values from a different source.
Provenance can substantially reduce the number of observations needed to gener-
ate a quality model. Recall that all RPC data objects are annotated with provenance;
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thus, the objects in the final request result have provenance data. In many cases, the
provenance relationship is direct; an output object depends only on a specific input
provenance. In such cases, we can infer that the effect of a data-quality tradeoff would
be to omit the specified output object, replace it with a default value, etc. Thus, given
a specific output annotated with provenance, we can infer what the quality would be
if further data-quality tradeoffs were made (e.g., a specific set of provenance features
were used to omit objects from an aggregation). In such cases, the processing of one
request can generate many different data points for the quality model. If the prove-
nance relationship is not direct, DQBarge generates these data points by sampling
more requests and making different tradeoffs.
Because code changes will gradually render such models obsolete, we envision
that DQBarge will continuously or periodically update its models by sampling a low
percentage of production traffic.
4.3.3 Using the models
DQBarge uses its performance and quality models to make better, more proactive
data-quality tradeoffs. System operators specify a high-level goal such as maximizing
quality given a latency cap on request processing. Software components call DQBarge
at each potential tradeoff point during request processing; the library returns a deci-
sion as to whether a tradeoff should be made and, if appropriate, what fidelity should
be employed (e.g., which data source to use or which values to leave out of an aggre-
gation). The software component then implements that decision proactively; i.e., it
makes the tradeoff immediately.
DQBarge currently supports three high-level goals: maximizing quality subject
to a component-level latency constraint, maximizing quality while using only slack
execution time available during request processing, and maximizing utility as a func-
tion of quality and performance. These goals are useful for mitigating load spikes,
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efficiently using spare resources, and implementing dynamic capacity planning, re-
spectively. We next describe these three goals in more detail.
4.3.3.1 Load Spikes
Services are provisioned to handle peak request loads. However, changes in usage
or traffic are unpredictable; e.g., the launch of a new feature may introduce additional
traffic. Thus, systems are designed to handle unexpected load spikes; the reactive
data-quality tradeoffs we saw in Section 4.2 are one such mechanism. DQBarge
improves on existing practice by letting an operator specify a maximum latency for
a request or a component of request processing. It maximizes quality subject to this
constraint by making data-quality tradeoffs.
At each tradeoff site, there may be many potential tradeoffs that can be made
(e.g., sets of values with different provenance may be left out of an aggregation or
distinct alternate data stores may be queried). DQBarge orders possible tradeoffs by
“bang for the buck” and greedily selects tradeoffs until the latency goal is reached.
It ranks each potential tradeoff by the ratio of the projected improvement in latency
(given by the performance model) to the decrease in request fidelity (given by the
quality model). The independent parameters of the model are the current system
load and the provenance of the input data. DQBarge selects tradeoffs in descending
order of this ratio until the performance model predicts that the latency limit will be
met.
4.3.3.2 Utilizing spare resources
Because DQBarge has a prediction of request processing time for each software
component, it can estimate which components are on the critical path and which com-
ponents have slack available in processing time. If a component has slack, DQBarge
can make tradeoffs that improve quality without negatively impacting the end-to-end
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request latency observed by the user. Similar to the previous scenario, DQBarge cal-
culates the ratio of quality improvement to latency decrease for each potential tradeoff
(the difference is that this goal involves improving quality rather than performance).
It then greedily selects tradeoffs according to this order until the additional latency
would exceed the projected slack time.
4.3.3.3 Dynamic capacity planning
DQBarge allows operators to specify the utility (e.g., the dollar value) of reducing
latency and improving quality. It then selects the tradeoffs that improve utility until
no more such tradeoffs are available. DQBarge also allows operators to specify the
impact of adding or removing resources (e.g., compute nodes) as a utility function
parameter. DQBarge compares the value of the maximum utility function with more
and less resources and generates a callback if adding or removing resources would
improve the current utility. Such callbacks allow dynamic re-provisioning.
4.3.3.4 Discussion
DQBarge does not guarantee an optimal solution since it employs greedy algo-
rithms to search through potential tradeoffs. However, an optimal solution is likely
unnecessary given the inevitable noise that arises from predicting traffic and from
errors in modeling. For the last use case, DQBarge assumes that operators can quan-
tify the impact of changes to service response times, quality, and the utilization of
additional resources. DQBarge also assumes that tradeoffs are independent, since
calculating models over joint distributions would be difficult.
4.3.4 Logging data-quality decisions
DQBarge logs all data-quality decisions and includes them in the provenance of
the request data objects. The information logged includes the software component,
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the point in the execution where a tradeoff decision was made, and the specific de-
cision that was made (e.g., which values were left out of an aggregation). To reduce
the amount of data that is logged, only instances where a tradeoff was made are
recorded. Timeouts and error return codes are also logged if they result in a reactive
data-quality tradeoff. This information helps system administrators and developers
understand how low-level data-quality tradeoffs are affecting the performance and
quality of production request processing.
4.4 Case studies
We have implemented the main components of DQBarge in a portion of the Face-
book request processing pipeline, and we have evaluated the results using Facebook
production traffic. Our current Facebook implementation allows us to track prove-
nance, generate performance and quality models and measure the efficacy of the
data-quality tradeoffs available through these models. This implementation thus al-
lows us to understand the feasibility and potential benefit of applying these ideas to
current production code.
We have also implemented the complete DQBarge system in Sirius [39], an open-
source personal digital assistant akin to Siri. Our Sirius implementation enables
end-to-end evaluation of DQBarge, such as observing how data-quality tradeoffs can
be used to react to traffic spikes and the availability of slack in the request pipeline.
4.4.1 Facebook
Our implementation of DQBarge at Facebook focuses on a page ranking service,
which we will call Ranker in this paper. When a user loads the Facebook home page,
Ranker uses various parameters of the request, such as the identity of the requester,
to generate a ranked list of page recommendations. Ranker first generates candidate
recommendations. It has a flexible architecture that allows the creation and use of
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multiple candidate generators; at the time of our study, there were over 30 candidate
generators that collectively produced hundreds of possible recommendations for each
request.
Ranker retrieves feature vectors for each candidate from Laser, the key-value store
we studied in Section 4.2. Ranker is a service that makes reactive data-quality trade-
offs. If an error or timeout occurs when retrieving features, Ranker omits the candi-
date(s) associated with those features from the aggregation of candidates and features
considered by the rest of the Ranker pipeline.
Ranker uses the features to calculate a score for each candidate. The algorithm
for calculating the score was opaque to us (it is based on a machine learning model
regenerated daily). It then orders candidate by score and returns the top N candi-
dates.
DQBarge leverages existing tracing and monitoring infrastructure at Facebook. It
uses a production version of the Mystery Machine tracing and performance analysis
infrastructure [30]. This tool discovers and reports performance characteristics of the
processing of Facebook requests, including which components are on the critical path.
From this data, we can calculate the slack available for each component of request
processing; prior results [30] showed that, given an observation of past requests by
the same user, slack for future requests can be predicted with high accuracy. Existing
Facebook systems monitor load at each component in the pipeline.
DQBarge annotates data passed along the pipeline with provenance. The data
object for each candidate is annotated with the generator that produced the data.
Similarly, features and other data retrieved for each candidate are associated with
their data source.
We implemented meters at the end of the Ranker pipeline that measure the latency
and quality of the final response. To measure quality, we compare the difference in
ranking of the top N pages returned from the full-quality response (with no data-
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quality tradeoffs made) and the lower-fidelity response (that includes some tradeoffs).
For example, if the highest-ranked page in the lower-fidelity response is the third-
ranked page in the full-quality response, the quality drop is two.
4.4.2 Sirius
We also added DQBarge to Sirius [39], an open-source personal assistant similar
to Apple’s Siri or Google Now. Sirius answers fact-based questions based on a set of
configurable data sources. The default source is an indexed Wikipedia database; an
operator may add other sources such as online search engines.
Sirius generates several queries from the question; each query represents a unique
method of parsing the question. For each query, it generates a list of documents
that are relevant to answering the query. Each document is passed through a natural
language processing pipeline to derive possible answers. Sirius assigns each answer a
numerical score and returns the top-ranked answer.
Data-quality tradeoffs in Sirius occur when aggregating values from multiple sub-
service queries. Our DQBarge implementation makes these tradeoffs proactively by
using quality and performance models to decide which documents to leave out of the
aggregation when the system is under load.
Initially, Sirius did not have request tracing or load monitoring infrastructure.
We therefore added the ability to trace and measure the performance by integrating
the Mystery Machine[30] software package. Each request has a unique identifier that
is propagated through every component of the pipeline. The performance of each
component is measured and the causal relationship among components is determined
through empirical observation of large sets of traces. This allows the request critical
path and slack for each component to be calculated offline. We also implemented a
slack predictor using this data that estimates the available slack for each component.
For load, we added counters at each pipeline stage to measure request rates. Addition-
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ally, we track the CPU load and memory usage of the entire service. The performance
data, predicted slack, and load information are all propagated by DQBarge as each
request flows through the Sirius pipeline.
In each stage of the Sirius pipeline, provenance is propagated along with data ob-
jects. For example, when queries are formed from the original question, the algorithm
used to generate the query is associated with the query object. Sirius provenance also
includes the data used to generate the list of candidate documents.
Since Sirius did not have a request duplication mechanism, we added the ability
to sample requests and send the same request through multiple instances of the Sirius
pipeline. User requests are read-only with respect to Sirius data stores, so we did not
have to isolate any modifications to service state from duplicated requests.
4.5 Evaluation
Our evaluation answers the following questions:
• Do data-quality tradeoffs improve performance?
• How much does provenance improve tradeoffs?
• How much does proactivity improve tradeoffs?
• How well does DQBarge meet end-to-end performance and quality goals?
4.5.1 Experimental setup
For Ranker, we perform our evaluation on Facebook servers using live Facebook
traffic by sampling and duplicating Ranker requests. Our entire implementation uses
request duplication pipelines, so as to not affect the results returned to Facebook
users. We change the system load by sampling a larger or smaller number of Ranker
requests.
For Sirius, we evaluated our end-to-end implementation of DQBarge on 16-core
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Figure 4.2: Ranker performance model This graph shows the effect of varying the
frequency of data-quality tradeoffs on Ranker request latency. We varied the request
rate by sampling different percentages of live production traffic at Facebook.
3.1GHz Xeon servers with 96GB of memory. We send Sirius questions sampled from
an archive from previous TREC conferences [89].
4.5.2 Performance benefits
We first measure the effect of data-quality tradeoffs on throughput and latency by
generating performance models for Ranker and Sirius. DQBarge performs a full pa-
rameter sweep through the dimensions of request rate, tradeoff frequency, and prove-
nance of the data being considered for each tradeoff, sampling at regular intervals.
For brevity, we report only a portion of these results.
4.5.2.1 Ranker
Figure 4.2 shows the latency-response curve for Ranker when DQBarge varies the
incoming request rate. Each curve shows the best fit for samples taken at a different
tradeoff rate, which we define to be the frequency at which data tradeoffs are made.
At a tradeoff rate of 0%, no candidates are dropped from the Ranker aggregation.
These results show that data-quality tradeoffs substantially improve Ranker la-
tency at low loads (less than 2500 requests/minute); e.g., at a 30% tradeoff rate,
latency decreases by 28%. Prior work has shown that server slack at Facebook is
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Figure 4.3: Sirius performance model. This graph shows the effect of varying
the frequency of data-quality tradeoffs on Sirius request latency. Each curve shows a
different tradeoff rate.
predictable on a per-request basis [30]. Thus, in this region, Ranker could make more
tradeoffs to reduce end-to-end response time when Ranker is on the critical path of
request processing, yet it could still provide full-fidelity responses when it has slack
time for further processing.
Data-quality tradeoffs also improve scalability under load. Taking 250ms as a
reasonable knee in the latency-response curve, Ranker can process approximately
2500 requests per minute without making tradeoffs, but it can handle 4300 requests
per minute when the tradeoff rate is 50% (a 72% increase). This allows Ranker to
run at a lower fidelity during a load spike.
DQBarge found that the provenance of the data values selected for tradeoffs does
not significantly affect performance. In other words, while the number of tradeoffs
made has the effect shown in Figure 4.2, the specific candidates that are proactively
omitted from an aggregation do not matter. Thus, we only show the effect of the
request rate and tradeoff rate.
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Figure 4.4: Impact of provenance on Ranker quality. We compare response
quality using provenance with a baseline that does not consider provenance. Each
graph shows the quality drop of the top ranked page, which is the difference between
where it appears in the Ranker rankings with and without data-quality tradeoffs. A
quality drop of 0 is ideal.
4.5.2.2 Sirius
Figure 4.3 shows results for Sirius. Like Ranker, the provenance of the data items
selected for tradeoffs did not affect performance, so we show latency-response curves
that vary both request rate and tradeoff rate.
The results for Sirius are similar to those for Ranker. A tradeoff rate of 50%
reduces end-to-end request latency by 26%. Under load, a 50% tradeoff rate increases
Sirius throughput by approximately 200%.
4.5.3 Effect of provenance
We next consider how much provenance improves the tradeoffs made by DQBarge.
We consider a baseline quality model that does not take into account any provenance;
e.g., given a target tradeoff rate, it randomly omits data values from an aggregation.
This is essentially the policy in existing systems like Ranker and Sirius because there
is no inherent order in requests from lower-level services and data stores and timeouts
therefore affect a random sampling of the values returned. In contrast, DQBarge uses
its quality model to select which values to omit, with the objective of choosing those
that affect the final output the least.
80
0 >10 >50
Quality Drop
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Fr
a
ct
io
n
 o
f 
re
q
u
e
st
s
Baseline
Provenance
(a) Tradeoff rate 10%
0 >10 >50
Quality Drop
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Fr
a
ct
io
n
 o
f 
re
q
u
e
st
s
Baseline
Provenance
(b) Tradeoff rate 50%
0 >10 >50
Quality Drop
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Fr
a
ct
io
n
 o
f 
re
q
u
e
st
s
Baseline
Provenance
(c) Tradeoff rate 80%
Figure 4.5: Impact of provenance on Sirius quality. We compare response
quality using provenance with a baseline that does not consider provenance. Each
graph shows the quality drop of the Sirius answer, which is the difference between
where it appears in the Sirius rankings with and without data-quality tradeoffs. A
quality drop of 0 is ideal.
4.5.3.1 Ranker
We first used DQBarge to sample production traffic at Facebook and construct
a quality model for Ranker. DQBarge determined that, by far, the most important
provenance parameter affecting quality is the generator used to produce a candidate.
For example, one particular generator produces approximately 17% of the top-ranked
pages but only 1% of the candidates. Another generator produces only 1% of the
top-ranked pages but accounts for 3% of the candidates.
Figure 4.4 compares the quality of request results for DQBarge with a baseline
that makes tradeoffs without using provenance. We sample live Facebook traffic, so
the requests in this experiment are different from those used to generate the quality
model. We vary the tradeoff rate and measure the quality drop of the top ranked
page; this is the difference between where the page appears in the request that makes
a data-quality tradeoff and where it would appear if no data-quality tradeoffs was
made. The ideal quality drop is zero.
As shown in Figure 4.4a, at a low tradeoff rate of 10%, using provenance reduces
the percentage of requests that experience any quality drop at all from 11% to 6%.
With provenance, only 1% of requests experienced a quality drop of more than three,
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Figure 4.6: Performance of reactive tradeoffs. This graph compares the distri-
bution of request latencies for Sirius when tradeoffs are made reactively via timeouts
and when they are made proactively via DQBarge.
compared to 5% without provenance. Figure 4.4b shows a higher tradeoff rate of
50%. Using provenance decreases the percentage of requests with any quality drop
at all from 43% to 33%. Only 3% of requests experienced a quality drop of 10 or
more, compared to a baseline result of 17%. Figure 4.4c compares quality at a high
tradeoff rate of 80%. Use of provenance still provides a modest benefit: 59% of
requests experience a quality drop, compared to 62% for the baseline. Further, with
provenance, the quality drop is 10 or more for only 15% of request compared with
28% for the baseline.
4.5.3.2 Sirius
For Sirius, we used k-fold cross validation to separate our benchmark set of ques-
tions into training and test data. The training data was used to generate a quality
model based on provenance features, which included the language parsing algorithm
used, the number of occurrences of key words derived from the question, the length of
the data source document considered, and a weighted score relating the query words
to the source document.
Figure 4.5 compares the quality of Sirius results with DQBarge using provenance
with a baseline that does not use provenance. As shown in Figure 4.5a, at a trade-
off rate of 10%, provenance decreases the quality drop for the answer produced by
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Figure 4.7: This graph shows that using proactive tradeoffs at a tradeoff rate of 40%
can achieve higher quality tradeoffs than using reactive tradeoffs with a timeout of
1.5s in Sirius.
Sirius from 13% to 7%. Only 1% of requests see a quality drop of 10 or more using
provenance, compared to 6% for the basline. Figure 4.5b shows that, for a higher
tradeoff rate of 50%, provenance decreases the percentage of requests that see any
quality drop from 46% to 23%. Further, only 8% of requests see a quality drop of
10 or more using provenance, compared to 25% for the baseline. Figure 4.5c shows
a tradeoff rate of 80%; provenance decreases the percentage of requests that see any
quality drop from 73% to 48%.
4.5.4 Effect of proactivity
We next examine how proactivity affects data-quality tradeoffs. In this experi-
ment, we send requests to Sirius at a high rate of 120 requests per minute. Without
DQBarge, this rate occasionally triggers a 1.5 second timeout for retrieving docu-
ments, causing some documents to be left out of the aggregation. These tradeoffs are
reactive in that they occur only after a timeout expires. In contrast, with DQBarge,
tradeoffs are made proactively at a rate of 40%.
Figure 4.6 shows request latency as a CDF for both the reactive and proactive
methods of making data-quality tradeoffs. Comparing the two distributions shows
that DQBarge improves performance across the board; e.g., the median request la-
tency is 3.4 seconds for proactive tradeoffs and 3.6 seconds for reactive tradeoffs.
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Figure 4.8: Response to a load spike. DQBarge makes data-quality tradeoffs to
meet a median latency goal of 6s.
Figure 4.7 shows that proactive tradeoffs also improve quality. DQBarge slightly
decreases the number of requests that have no quality drop from 20% to 19%. More
significantly, it reduces the number of requests that have a quality drop of more than
10 from 18% to 6%.
Under high loads, reactive tradeoffs hurt performance because they waste resources
(e.g., trying to retrieve documents that are not used in the aggregation). Further,
their impact on quality is greater than with DQBarge because timeouts affect a
random sampling of the values returned, whereas proactive tradeoffs omit retrieving
those documents that are least likely to impact the reply.
4.5.5 End-to-end case studies
We next evaluate DQBarge with three end-to-end case studies on our Sirius
testbed.
4.5.5.1 Load spikes
In this scenario, we introduce a load spike to see if DQBarge can maintain end-to-
end latency and throughput goals by making data-quality tradeoffs. We set a target
median response rate of 6 seconds. Normally, Sirius receives 50 requests/minute,
but it experiences a two-minute load spike of 150 requests/minute in the middle of
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Figure 4.9: Quality improvement using spare resources. DQBarge uses slack
in request pipeline stages to improve response quality.
the experiment. Figure 4.8 shows that without DQBarge, the end-to-end latency
increases significantly due to the load spike. The median latency within the load
spike region averages 25.2 seconds across 5 trials.
In comparison, DQBarge keeps median request latency below the 6 second goal
throughout the experiment. Across 5 runs, the median end-to-end latency during
the spike region is 5.4 seconds. In order to meet the desired latency goal, DQBarge
generally selects a tradeoff rate of 50%, resulting in a mean quality drop of 6.7.
4.5.5.2 Utilizing spare resources
In the second scenario, we see if DQBarge can effectively use spare capacity and
slack in the request processing pipeline to increase quality without affecting end-to-
end latency. Sirius is configured to use both its default Wikipedia database and the
Bing Search API [14] to answer queries. Each source has a separate pipeline that
executes in parallel before results from all sources are compared at the end. The Bing
pipeline tends to take longer than the default pipeline, so slack typically exists in the
default pipeline stages.
As described in Section 4.4.2, DQBarge predicts the critical path for each request
and the slack for pipeline stages not on the critical path. If DQBarge predicts there is
slack available for a processing pipeline, it reduces the tradeoff frequency to increase
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Figure 4.10: Performance impact of using spare resources. When DQBarge
uses slack in request pipeline stages, it does not impact end-to-end latency.
quality until the predicted added latency would exceed the predicted slack. To give
DQBarge room to increase quality, we set the default tradeoff rate to 50% for this
experiment; note that this simply represents a specific choice between quality and
latency made by the operator of the system.
Figure 4.9 shows that DQBarge increases quality for this experiment by using spare
resources; the percentage of requests that exprience any quality drop decreases from
38% to 22% (as compared to a full-fidelity response with no data-quality tradeoffs).
Figure 4.10 shows a CDF of request response times; because the extra processing oc-
curs off the critical path, the end-to-end request latency is unchanged when DQBarge
attempts to employ only spare resources to increase quality.
4.5.5.3 Dynamic capacity planning
Finally, we show how DQBarge can be used in dynamic capacity planning. We
specify a utility function that provides a dollar value for reducing latency, improving
quality, and provisioning additional servers. The utility of latency and quality are
shown in Figure 4.11. DQBarge makes data-quality tradeoffs that maximize the
utility function at the incoming request rate.
In this scenario, we examine the benefit of using DQBarge to decide when to
provision addtional resrouces. We compare DQBarge with dynamic capacity planning
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Figure 4.11: Utility parameters for dynamic capacity planning. These values
are added together to calculate final utility.
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Figure 4.12: Benefit of dynamic capacity planning. With dynamic capacity
planning, DQBarge improves utility by provisioning an additional server.
against DQBarge without dynamic capacity planning. Figure 4.12 shows the total
utility of the system over time. When the request rate increases to 160 requests
per minute, DQBarge reports that provisioning another server would provide a net
positive utility. Using this server increases utility by an average of 58% compared to
a system without dynamic capacity planning.
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CHAPTER V
Related Work
The area of causality analysis is a well-studied field. The work presented in this
thesis builds on many foundational ideas.
Taint tracking initially was used in the security domain to detect software at-
tacks [62] online while a program is executing. Since its introduction, systems have
used taint tracking for understanding fine-grained causality outside of the security
domain. For example it has been applied to diagnose misconfigurations [8, 7], foren-
sics [49], finding privacy leaks [34, 69, 55], and data provenance [32].
Online taint tracking systems require low overheads to run in production. This
requires constraining the types of queries that can be run online. For example, a
typical online query tracks whether sensitive data is leaked during the execution of
a program [34]. The requirement of having low online overheads constrains the type
of supportable queries to be relative simple; these queries require knowing which
inputs are of interest beforehand. This constraint has limited the number of possible
taint sources that can be tracked. It has also led to specialized hardware support
to accelerate taint tracking [22, 93, 42]. Although these systems speed up online
propagation of taint, the number of supported taint sources are limited by hardware
constraints.
Our taint tracking framework is focused on after-the-fact analysis that is suit-
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able for tasks like forensics [49], debugging misconfigurations [8, 7], and data prove-
nance [32]. Our taint tracking framework differentiates itself from previous systems
in its ability to track millions of input sources, orders of magnitude greater than the
state of the art. The use of deterministic replay in our system enables low online
overheads. Replaying executions offline enables complex queries that are too heavy-
weight to perform online. These complex queries allow for answering what inputs
influenced a particular byte of output. Our taint tracking framework is able to sup-
port tens of millions of taint labels while also being able to support a wide variety of
complex, multi-threaded programs. Additionally, our taint tracking framework works
on application binaries, without the need of source code.
Besides taint tracking, there are other methods that have been used to under-
stand fine-grained causality with various tradeoffs in speed, complexity, and over-
head. Static taint analysis [6, 94] has been used to track causality from sources to
sinks by examining all possible static code paths from source to sink. It also has
the benefit of performing the analysis offline. However, these static techniques suffer
from imprecision and over-tainting. Additionally, the number of sources are limited
in order to have an efficient analysis. Reverse execution [68, 4] is a technique that
allows for stepping back through an execution and examining the effects of a par-
ticular instruction. Recap [68] achieves the appearance of this effect by periodically
taking checkpoints and logging system calls and shared memory accesses in order to
reproduce intervals of program execution. This is similar to a deterministic replay
system with checkpointing. Akgul et al. [4] statically produce a reverse execution
binary of the program and uses dynamic slicing in order to answer backward queries.
However, the static analysis required to produce a reverse execution version of the
binary does not scale beyond simple programs.
Symbolic execution is another technique for deriving causality in a program [19,
27]. Symbolic execution replaces inputs with symbolic values in order to reason about
89
the program logically. It enables analyzing all possible paths of program execution.
Compared to taint tracking, the complexity in scaling symbolic execution is not in
dealing with a large number of inputs, since inputs are represented symbolically, but
rather the complexity of the program. Symbolic execution is prone to path explosion,
making it difficult to reason about complex multi-threaded programs.
On the other side of the spectrum, large-scale Internet systems have posed difficul-
ties in understanding causality between the software components that make up these
systems. The scale, heterogeneity, and fast-changing nature of these systems makes
understanding causality in these systems difficult. Previous systems have derived a
model of causal dependencies can be derived from comprehensively instrumenting all
middleware for communication, scheduling, and/or synchronization to record compo-
nent interactions [3, 7, 21, 36, 50, 58, 76, 78, 87]. In contrast to these prior systems,
The Mystery Machine is targeted at environments where adding comprehensive new
instrumentation to an existing system would be too time-consuming due to hetero-
geneity (e.g., at Facebook, there a great number of scheduling, communication, and
synchronization schemes used during end-to-end request processing) and deployment
feasibility (e.g., it is not feasible to add new instrumentation to client machines or
third-party Web browser code). Instead, The Mystery Machine extracts a causal
model from already-existing log messages, relying only a minimal schema for such
messages. Like these previous systems, The Mystery Machine uses the causal model
to perform well-known performance analyses such as critical path, slack, and what-if
analysis.
Finally, data-quality tradeoffs are a specific type of quality-of-service tradeoff [15,
65, 85], akin to recent work in approximate computing [10, 20, 44, 43, 84, 86]. The
distinguishing feature of data-quality tradeoffs is that they are embedded in low-level
software components within complex Internet pipelines. This leads to a lack of global
knowledge and makes it difficult for individual components to determine how making
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specific tradeoffs will impact overall service latency and quality. DQBarge addresses
this issue by incorporating principles from the literature on causal tracing [13, 21, 24,
36, 57, 76, 77, 87] to propagate needed knowledge along the path of request processing,
enabling better tradeoffs by providing the ability to assess the impact of tradeoffs.
The remainder of this chapter discusses specific prior work that has influenced the
work discussed in this thesis for scaling intraprocess taint tracking, scaling causality
to large-scale systems, and using causality to make better data quality tradeoffs.
5.1 Scaling intraprocess taint tracking
The earliest taint tracking frameworks, such as TaintCheck [62], only support a
single bit indicating whether data is tainted or untainted. TaintCheck focused on
tracking a limited set of input from unknown network sources. Since then, LIFT [74]
and libdft [48] are forward taint tracking frameworks with several optimizations that
are suited for speeding up online dynamic taint tracking. Their taint representa-
tions allow for fast taint merge operations through the use of bit vectors. However,
this fundamentally limits the number of taint labels that can be efficiently tracked.
DyTan [31] is similar to our framework in being flexible in scoping inputs and out-
puts and supports several taint propagation functions. Like libdft and LIFT, DyTan
uses a bit vector to represent taint sets so the number of unique sources it supports
is fundamentally limited by the length of the representation. TaintPipe [60] uses a
symbolic taint analysis to convert segments of machine code to the symbolic taint
operation. The symbolic representation allows them to support a larger number of
inputs compared with the previous systems’ bit-level representation. It is unclear
whether symbolic tracking can scale efficiently to millions of labels and dependencies.
Other prior work has sped up taint tracking using parallelization [63, 80, 47], but
they only support a limited number of taint sources.
The merge log is derived from the log optimization proposed by Ruwase et al. [80].
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Ruwase et al. and the merge log both offer a compact way of representing taint sets.
Ruwase et al. use a symbolic representation of taint operations, which is only resolved
when the taint of a location is needed. The merge log keeps a concrete representation
of all taint sets as the program executes and resolves the taint set of a location by
traversing the merge log. Our enhancements to the merge log allows us to support the
tracking of millions of input sources. The merge log structure is a flat data structure
of a DAG, which has been used in other applications such as the binary decision
diagram [17].
Deterministic replay is a well-studied technique for faithfully reproducing the ex-
ecution of programs. It has been used for debugging data races [5, 70, 92] and intru-
sion detection [33]. Our deterministic replay implementation has the unique ability to
cheaply record an uninstrumented execution and later replay the execution using Pin.
We leverage deterministic replay in order to reduce online overhead. Some previous
taint tracking systems have used the idea decoupling of execution from the DIFT
analysis in order to accelerate taint tracking for the same purpose [47, 60].
5.2 The Mystery Machine
Critical path analysis is an intuitive technique for understanding the performance
of systems with concurrent activity. It has been applied in a wide variety of ar-
eas such as processor design [82], distributed systems [12], and Internet and mobile
applications [76, 95].
Sherlock [11] also uses a “big data” approach to build a causal model. However,
it relies on detailed packet traces, not log messages. Packet traces would not serve
our purpose: it is infeasible to collect them on user clients, and they reveal nothing
about the interaction of software components that run on the same computer (e.g.,
JavaScript), which is a major focus of our work. Observing a packet sent between A
and B inherently implies some causal relationship, while The Mystery Machine must
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infer such relationships by observing if the order of log messages from A and B obey
a hypothesized invariant. Hence, Sherlock’s algorithm is fundamentally different: it
reasons based on temporal locality and infers probabilistic relationships; in contrast,
The Mystery Machine uses only message order to derive invariants (though timings
are used for critical path and slack analysis).
The lprof tool [99] also analyzes log messages to reconstruct the ordering of logged
events in a request. It supplements logs with static analysis to discover dependen-
cies between log points and uses those dependencies to differentiate events among
requests. Since static analysis is difficult to scale to heterogeneous production en-
vironments, The Mystery Machine used some manual modifications to map events
to traces and leverages a large sample size and natural variation in ordering to infer
causal dependencies between events in a request.
In other domains, hypothesizing likely invariants and eliminating those contra-
dicted by observations has proven to be a successful technique. For instance, likely
invariants have been used for fault localization [81] and diagnosing software er-
rors [35, 73]. The Mystery Machine applies this technique to a new domain.
Many other systems have looked at the notion of critical path in Web services.
WebProphet [54] infers Web object dependencies by injecting delays into the loading
of Web objects to deduce the true dependencies between Web objects. The Mystery
Machine instead leverages a large sample size and the natural variation of timings to
infer the causal dependencies between segments. WProf [95] modifies the browser to
learn browser page load dependencies. It also injects delays and uses a series of test
pages to learn the dependencies and applies a critical path analysis. The Mystery
Machine looks at end-to-end latency from the server to the client. It automatically
deduces a dependency model by analyzing a large set of requests. Google Pagespeed
Insight [37] profiles a page load and reports its best estimate of the critical path from
the client’s perspective. The Mystery Machine traces a Web request from the server
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through the client, enabling it to deduce the end-to-end critical path.
Chen et al. [26] analyzed end-to-end latency of a search service. They also analyzed
variation along the server, network, and client components. The Mystery Machine
analyzes end-to-end latency using critical path analysis, which allows for attributing
latency to specific components and performing slack analysis.
Many other systems have looked at automatically discovering service dependen-
cies in distributed systems by analyzing network traffic. Orion [25] passively observes
network packets and relies on discovering service dependencies by correlating spikes
in network delays. The Mystery Machine uses a minimum common content tracing
infrastructure finds counterexamples to disprove causal relationship dependencies.
WISE [88] answers ”what-if” questions in CDN configuration. It uses machine learn-
ing techniques to derive important features that affect user response time and uses
correlation to derive dependencies between these features. Butkiewicz et al. [18] mea-
sured which network and client features best predicted Web page load times across
thousands of websites. They produced a predictive model from these features across
a diverse set of Web pages. The Mystery Machine aims to characterize the end-to-end
latency in a single complex Web service with a heterogeneous client base and server
environment.
The technique of using logs for analysis has been applied to error diagnosis [5, 97,
96] and debugging performance issues [61, 83].
5.3 Data Quality Tradeoffs
Although there is an extremely rich history of quality-of-service tradeoffs [15, 65,
85] and approximate computing [10, 20, 44, 43, 84, 86] in software systems, our work
focuses specifically on using the causal propagation of request information and data
provenance to make better data-quality tradeoffs in low-level software components.
Our study revealed the need for such an approach: existing Facebook services make
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mostly reactive tradeoffs that are suboptimal due to limited information. Our eval-
uation of DQBarge showed that causal propagation can substantially improve both
request performance and response quality.
Many systems have used causal propagation of information through distributed
systems to trace related events [13, 21, 24, 36, 57, 76, 77, 87]. For example, Pivot
Tracing [57] propagates generic key-value metadata, called baggage, along the causal
path of request processing. DQBarge uses a similar approach to propagate specific
data such as provenance, critical path predictions, and load metrics.
DQBarge focuses on data quality tradeoffs in Internet service pipelines. Ap-
proximate Query Processing systems trade accuracy for performance during analytic
queries over large data sets [1, 2, 9, 41, 51]. These systems use different methods to
sample data and return a representative answer within a time bound. BlinkDB [2]
uses an error-latency profile to make tradeoffs during query processing. This is similar
to the performance and quality models that DQBarge applies to Internet pipelines.
Some Internet services have been adapted to provide partial responses after a la-
tency deadline [40, 46, 51]. They rely on timeouts to make tradeoffs, whereas the
tradeoffs DQBarge makes are proactive. PowerDial [44] adds knobs to server appli-
cations to trade performance for energy. These systems do not employ provenance to
make better tradeoffs.
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CHAPTER VI
Conclusion
This chapter describes directions for future work and summarizes the contributions
of this thesis.
6.1 Future work
In this thesis we focused on scaling causality analysis at both a fine-grain instruc-
tion level for a single process and for a large-scale distributed system with hundreds of
software components. We next discuss areas of future research for continuing scaling
DIFT and leveraging causality for debugging and troubleshooting.
6.1.1 Parallelizing DIFT
In chapter II, we describe a method for scaling taint tracking to millions of input
sources. However, our method only utilizes a single CPU core; parallelizing DIFT
is difficult since each step could have a large set of prior dependencies. There has
been previous work done in parallelizing DIFT [80, 63]. However, these systems only
scale to one computer and still do not provide the level of interactivity required to
run DIFT queries for long running, complicated programs. Scaling DIFT to a cluster
of machines would make queries interactive. Researchers are actively working on
parallelizing DIFT [75].
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6.1.2 Personalized performance
Our results from chapter III and chapter IV show that causal information yield op-
timizations that lead to better performance. We examined how causality can improve
data quality tradeoffs. As future research, we propose using causality to introduce
client-specific optimizations that improve performance. We hypothesize that using
client-specific information can lead to client-specific performance optimizations.
As our studies have shown, users of Internet services are increasingly diverse in
the networks and platforms they employ. These networks and platforms have varying
characteristics. For example, mobile networks are poorer than broadband connec-
tions. Different browsers have various Javascript interpreters. Increasingly web ap-
plications have been reliant on Javascript to provide an interactive and content-rich
experience, but browsers have different Javascript interpreters with different per-
formance variances. We propose exploring different client-side optimizations. For
example, Internet services can produce Javascript content that is specific to a user’s
platform and/or mobile network. If a user is currently on a low-bandwidth network,
the server can choose to send low-bandwidth updates in order to provide a better
experience. If a user is low on energy, the server can choose to send updates that
require less energy to display. We could extend DQBarge by supporting these models
and their possible optimizations.
6.1.3 Identifying data quality tradeoffs
Our study in chapter IV relies on a combination of manual and automated anal-
ysis in order to identify and understand data-quality tradeoffs. As future research,
we propose automating this method for two purposes. First, an automated means
of studying data quality tradeoffs gives operators of all software services and under-
standing of how their services are used. Second, automation allows for these studies
to be continually done over time to understand how data quality tradeoffs change as
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systems evolve.
Using the categorizations from our study, we can train classifiers that statically
analyze code in order to identify existing data-quality tradeoffs in the code. This
would involve deriving a symbolic representation of the categorizations and match
the code to these patterns. For example, data quality tradeoffs that return a default
value should be match the same category even if they return different default values.
However, there are challenges in using static analysis as it can be prone to a high
false positive rate. Therefore, we plan on exploring automated means of verification,
such as sampling dynamic executions and evaluating the symbolic representation to
verify the correct classification.
6.2 Contributions
This thesis shows methods for scaling causality analysis for debugging and opti-
mization in programs and large-scale Internet services. First, we showed the ability
to scale fine-grain causality analysis to millions of input bytes. We demonstrated
this by scaling intraprocess taint tracking to millions of input bytes. This allows
for the ability to track the provenance of data from a particular output byte to any
particular set of input bytes. Next, we demonstrated how to scale causality analysis
to large-scale Internet services with hundreds of software components. We hypoth-
esized causal relationships between software components and rule out relationships
by leveraging the scale of these services and observing counter-examples. Using this
technique, we showed how we can use these causal relationships to understand perfor-
mance optimizations. Finally, we explored a new dimension that combines causality
with data quality tradeoffs. We conducted a study of data quality tradeoffs of a
production system at Facebook. We found that most data quality tradeoffs are reac-
tive and suboptimal. To address these issues, we developed DQBarge, a system that
uses causal propagation of information in order to make better data quality tradeoffs.
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We showed how we can make better data quality tradeoffs in situations such as load
spikes, utilization of spare resources, and dynamic capacity planning.
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